Happy Anniversary

To Rabbi and Mrs. Rotes on their anniversary.

Quote

"Both have been real nice."

- Bob Brenly, on the fans' acceptance of the Giants despite a bad season

Ephraim Stulberg on Vayikra, 5764

At the beginning of the Baraisa known as Toras Kohanim, we find the famous argument regarding whether women are permitted to perform mitzvot from which the Torah exempted them. "Speak unto the sons of Israel, and say to them…and he shall lean his hand on the head of the olah offering…" (Vayikra 1: 2-4). The baraisa notes the use of the term "sons of Israel", and explains that this term comes to exclude the "daughters of Israel". The first opinion in the baraisa believes that this exclusion comes to prohibit women from leaning ("s'micha"), while R' Yose and R' Shimon are of the opinion that women may nonetheless perform s'micha if they wish to do so ("nashim som'chos r'shus"). R" Yose then proceeds to recount a story in which he witnessed a ruling allowing women to perform s'micha, "not because women are obligated in s'micha, but in order to appease them."

The gemara (Chaggigah 16b) cites this baraisa in the context of a dispute regarding the nature of s'micha, namely whether it must be done with all one's might, or if merely placing one's hands on top of the animal is enough. It initially attempts to prove from the baraisa that s'micha involves only a minimal application of pressure, since otherwise, how could the women in the story have been permitted to perform s'micha if it had involved making forbidden use of the animal? The gemara replies that perhaps s'micha, in the usual sense, must indeed be done with all one's might. The s'micha performed by these women was merely a symbolic act, as they applied no real pressure.

The implication of the gemara seems to be that the argument of R' Yose and the first opinion cited in the baraisa regards only a s'micha which involves no act which would otherwise have been prohibited, such as leaning on the animal with one's full weight. There seems to be little evidence to suggest that R' Yose would allow a woman to perform an actual s'micha, however.

This interpretation, though, raises several difficulties. First of all, there is the question of why it is that the first opinion - revealed in Maseches Eiruvin (96b) to be that of R' Yehuda and R' Meir - should feel the need to prohibit even so innocuous an act as placing one's hands over the animal: a prohibition, moreover, which seems from the language of the baraisa to derive straight from the verse itself, and not from a rabbinic decree. Secondly, one must begin to wonder how the gemara felt itself justified in comparing the argument regarding women and s'micha to the case of a women who wishes to practice blowing a shofar on Shabbos (see Rosh Hashana 33a). According to Rashi's explanation of the argument, i.e. as revolving around the prohibition of "bal tosif", how can we compare a scenario in which no actual s'micha is being done, to one in which an actual blowing of the shofar takes place?

The conclusion we are forced to make, it once seemed to me, was that R' Yose in fact believes that even a real s'micha, performed with all one's weight, is permitted to women. Thus the opinion of the first Tanna also makes sense, as does his use of the biblical verse as the source of his objection. In both this case and that of shofar are we presented with potential "bal tosif" issues, according to Rashi. Though one might ask how the gemara can so casually assume that R' Yehuda, who prohibits s'micha, would also prohibit blowing the shofar, when perhaps the reason he disallows s'micha is because it involves performing work with sacrificial animals, this is in reality no question at all, since the two go hand in hand. If one believes that although women are exempt from the obligation to perform the mitzvah, they still retain a certain relevance to it, then there is no problem either from "bal tosif" or from performing work with sanctified animals, since they are indeed performing a relevant mitzvah action.

However, there is still a rather obvious question to be posed: according to our setup, how does the corroborating story incorporated into his argument by R' Yose help his cause, if the gemara specifically writes that the s'micha involved there was not a real one?

Fortunately, I came across the commentary of the Ra'avad on our baraisa in Toras Kohanim. The Ra'avad suggests that in reality, the argument between R' Yehuda and R' Yose involves both cases of real and phony s'micha. R' Yehuda believes that even a simulated s'micha is prohibited, since women might not distinguish, and might therefore come to perform actual s'micha, which is biblically prohibited. R' Yose believes that not only is an artificial s'micha okay, but so is a real one, since women retain their relevance to the mitzvah of s'micha, to the extent that it isn't considered doing work with sacrificial animals. The story he brings as a proof in his favour involved a case in which the women involved didn't own the animal being brought, so real s'micha was out of the question. The story was not meant necessarily to corroborate his own opinion regarding actual s'micha, which he permits if the woman owns the animal, so much as it was intended to discredit the opinion of R' Yehuda, who prohibited even simulated s'micha even if the animal was owned by the woman in question.

(As an aside, I believe the second opinion cited by Ra'avad is that of Tosafos - see Eiruvin 96a, while the first, which we've just mentioned, corresponds nicely with Rashi's understanding.)

Regarding the halacha, there is a well known dispute between Rabbeinu Tam (Rosh Hashana 33a) and Rambam (Laws of Tzitzis 3:9), mirrored in the Rema and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 589:6), regarding women's recitation of a blessing over mitzvos from which they are exempt, such as shofar and lulav. The Ashkenazic custom is to allow this, while Sefardim do not. Rabbeinu Tam writes explicitly that the halacha with regard to s'micha follows the opinion of R' Yose, since he corroborates his opinion by citing a precedent, while Rambam seems to believe that the halacha follows R' Yehuda and R' Meir - see Laws of Ma'asei Hakarbanos 3:8, though this is not necessarily a proof, based as it is on the mishnah in Menachos, which deals with a woman representing her husband, not herself. Ra'avad on Toras Kohanim supports the Rambam's approach, arguing that the "stam mishnah" in Rosh Hashana accords with the opinion of R' Yehuda. I'm sure there's something to be made of this differential weighting of the evidence and of different rules of halachic decision-making, but I'm not sure what it is. Generally, the halacha would follow R' Yose if he argued with either R' Meir or R' Yehuda, since "nimuko immo", but not when he argues with both. However, does the fact that R' Shimon agrees with R' Yose have any impact on things?

I would appreciate people's feedback on the issues presented here.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Happiness, n. An agreeable sensation arising from contemplating the misery of another.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Don't be a fool."

- SG

My trip to the Galilee

Yesterday I was sent (in shackles) on an expedition to the Galilee with two other Yeshiva guys. My wife decided that it would be terrible if we left Israel without me having ever seen Tiberias, Safed, etc.

It was a day-long bus trip with stops of varying lengths in Tiberias, Safed, Meron and Amukah. We saw the sites that are allegedly the burial places of Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Akiva, R' Yochanan Ben Zakai, R' Shimon Bar Yochai, R' Yehudai bar Ilai, Yonasan ben Uziel, Rava and Abaye.

We also visited the graves of Rambam, Ramchal, Arizal, R' Yosef Karo and others.

I have posted some pictures of my trip at www.flickr.com/photos/galiltrip.

Here is a choice photo I took of some chassidish kids in Tzfas. Yup, everyone's doing it these days...

Ephraim Stulberg on Hachodesh, 5764

At the beginning of this week's Maftir reading, Hashem commands Moshe: "Speak to the congregation of Israel, saying: "On the tenth of this month, and they shall take for themselves, each man, a lamb according to their fathers' houses, a lamb for each household" " (Sh'mos 12:3). This verse is the subject of some controversy, specifically regarding the meaning of the phrase "on the tenth of this month".

The Mechilta on this verse seems to take the most open stance on the issue: "The speaking occurred on the first of the month, the taking [of the lamb] on the tenth, and the slaughtering on the fourteenth." The placement of the esnachta after the word "saying" indicates that the quotation marks belong before the words "on the tenth". The verse is not to be read: "Speak to the congregation of Israel, saying on the tenth of this month."

This is not without debate, however. The gemara (P'sachim 6b) expresses doubt as to when Moshe actually informed the Jews of these commandments. As Tosafos note, while the command from Hashem to Moshe surely occurred on Rosh Chodesh, perhaps Moshe only told the Jews afterwards. Indeed, Rav Sa'adiah Gaon writes in his translation that Moshe was only commanded to tell the Jews these things on the tenth of the month, not the first. What was the significance of the tenth day? Was this a precise injunction, or were other days also acceptable for the selecting of the lamb? These questions are equally contentious. The Mechilta explains that if the tenth were an acceptable date, then surely the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth were also okay, since they were closer to the time of the actual sacrifice of the lamb. But the question is, so what? What does proximity to the day of the sacrifice have to do with anything? A simple reading of the Torah would seem to indicate that the purpose of this separation is to check the animal for any imperfections which would disqualify it as a Pesach sacrifice - see P'sachim 96a, where we derive a four day period for such an examination from this passage. But then, why is selection even on the fourteenth okay? And how come checking the animal applies to all generations, while specifying one's Pesach offering beforehand does not (ibid.). Surely something else is going on. The Da'as Z'keinim explains that the tenth day was chosen so that the Jews would have an opportunity to circumcise themselves and busy themselves with the Pesach offering for four days. It was in these merits that they were redeemed from Egypt, according to one opinion in the Mechilta. Since they required three days to heal from the circumcision before it was safe to travel - see Nedarim 31a - therefore they performed the circumcision on the tenth. (This seems to imply an interesting "chiddush", that the day of the circumcision is not counted among the three. But the calculation still seems to be off by a day.)

Targum "Yonasan" (12:6), following the Pesikta of Rav Kahana (P' Hachodesh) explains that this selection of the lamb was in order that the Jews show that they were not afraid of the Egyptians, whose deity they were preparing to kill. In this light, the Mechilta's logic makes more sense. The closer to the actual event this selection of the lambs occurred, the more powerful the impact on Egyptian sensibilities would be. If one is threatened with death, but only after a number of days or weeks, the shock is much less that if one is accosted by someone wielding a loaded gun threatening to pull the trigger immediately. Thus the Jews were not allowed to select their lambs before the tenth.

But still, why the tenth? The Pesikta of Rav Kahana seems to suggest a connection between this event and the crossing of the Jordan, which also occurred on the tenth of Nisan. Perhaps one might suggest that just as the selection of a Pesach lamb represented the first action of the Jews in their emancipation from Egypt, the first time that they were called upon to actually do anything, to take their "leap of faith" in more than a purely mental sense, so the entry into the Jordan was their first act of setting out to conquer the land of Cana'an, despite their numerical disadvantage. One sees here the power of taking the first step: as soon as the Kohanim entered the river, it split for them. Parashas Hachodesh, as much as anything, is about starting over, about taking the first steps towards growth. The lesson of Hachodesh, as the Pesikta notes, is "Chidshu Ma'aseichem", renew your actions.

Ephraim Stulberg on Pekudei, 5765

“And B’tzalel…did all that God commanded Moshe,” writes the Torah in P’ P’kudei (38:22). Rashi comments that this verse teaches us that even those aspects of the construction of the Mishkan commanded by God that Moshe had failed to relay to B’tzalel were carried out by the master craftsman. Whereas Moshe had been told to have the structure of the Mishkan itself built first, he had told B’tzalel to build the Ark first. B’tzalel, however, had reasoned that it was more logical to finish the building first before beginning to work on the vessels it was to house. When he informed Moshe of his decision, the latter exclaimed that this was precisely what God Himself had said to do.

Rashi’s comment (based on the gemara in B’rachos 55a) deserves some consideration. There are essentially two questions which ought to be asked here, and they are fairly obvious. First of all, where do we find that Moshe changed the order that he was given by God? And, secondly, if this indeed was the case, then why did Moshe act in the way he did? Considering its source, shouldn’t he have simply stuck with the initial construction schedule?

In my own (fairly standard) edition of the Mikra’os G’dolos Pentateuch, there is a note interpolated into the text of Rashi that attempts to answer the first question. It explains that, on the one hand, we find in P’ Ki Sisa that God tells Moshe, “Behold I have called upon B’tzalel…and Oholiav…and they shall make: the Tent of Meeting and the Ark for the Covenant and the Covering…” (31:2-7). The Torah does not tell us the order that Moshe told B’tzalel to build things in, but we can infer from our own verse that there were certain things which Moshe was told by God and yet did not relay to the workers. In Vayakhel (, Moshe’s conversation with B’tzalel and Oholiav does not discuss what they were to make at all, and so we are free to speculate as to how he might have switched the orders he’d been given from God.

This is obviously a rather unsatisfying explanation, if for no other reason than the fact that it contradicts what Rashi himself says in his commentary on the gemara in B’rachos. There, Rashi explains that, whereas God told Moshe in Ki Sisa to have the structure build first, Moshe had relayed to B’tzalel the order that the items are listed in P’ T’rumah, in which the Ark, Table and Menorah are listed before the actual building of the Mishkan is described. The gemara is assuming that this is the order in which Moshe gave the command to B’tzalel. The question is, why?

If we examine things closely, it seems to me that the conclusion we must draw is that in fact there were two separate commandments to build the Mishkan. The initial command came before the sin of the Golden Calf, and is recorded in P’ T’rumah. At that point, the Jews were on a very high spiritual level. At that point, they were commanded to build the Mishkan, but it was explicitly stated that God would ultimately dwell among the people themselves (Sh’mos 25:8). True, the Mishkan was to be a special locus of Godly “concentration”; but in general, the principle was to be that the Divine presence was to be available in any place that the Jews desired (see Sh’mos 20:21). Thus the building of the Ark, which was the real of locus of the Godly presence in this world (see Sh’mos 25:22), and whose poles symbolized its portability and universal accessibility, was commanded first: there was no need for a house to confine it, to protect it.

After the Jews built the Golden Calf, however, God repeated his command to Moshe, only with a twist. The Divine presence would no longer dwell amongst the Jews. It needed to be confined to a particular place. The walls of the Mishkan symbolized the fact that there would always be some sort of barrier limiting the Jews’ ability to commune with God. They needed to be built first.

Thus it was only at the second commandment that God told Moshe to hire B’tzalel to construct the Mishkan. This appointment was, of course, a means for the Jews to atone for the fact that they had murdered B’tzalel’s grandfather, Chur, when he objected to their plans to build the Golden Calf. The first commandment preceded this grievous sin. It is for this reason that Rashi only writes that the Golden Calf preceded the commandment regarding the Mishkan in P’ Ki Sisa (31:18).

There are other indications that there were in fact two separate commands, but these will have to suffice for now. At any rate, the day after Yom Kippur, Moshe convened the people and finally told them about the Mishkan. The gemara seems to assume that Moshe thought that things were back to normal, and that the Jews had regained their previous closeness with God. B’tzalel felt differently, and he therefore decided to make the building first.

(P.S. In Vayakheil itself, it does in fact seem as though Moshe commanded them to make the structure of the Mishkan first (see 35:11). I’m not really sure how the gemara gets around that.)

Ephraim Stulberg on Vayakhel, 5765

The Torah (Sh’mos 35:8) relates that Betzalel crafted the basin (“Kiyor”) out of bronze mirrors donated by those who congregated at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting (“Ohel Mo’ed”). Most commentators (Onkelos, Ibn Ezra, S’forno) suggest that these were the offerings of a group of pietistic women who would gather around the Tent to offer their prayers to God and to come and hear God’s words. By parting with their instruments of personal vanity, they renounced the desires of this world, in exchange for a glimpse of something more meaningful. The overall impression of these people is rather nun-like, the sort of person you’d rather not have as your high school English teacher.

Targum Yerushalmi adopts a much more nuanced position. It writes that these mirrors were the donations of “chaste women.” “And at the times they would go to the gates of the Tent of Meeting, they would stand over their sacrifice, ‘admusshon’, and give praise and thanksgiving [to God}, and return to their husbands and give birth to righteous children once they had become purified from their blood.” One immediately hears echoes of the other place in Scripture where “gathered women” are mentioned (Sh’muel I 2:22, as explained in Shabbos 56b), of women come to bring their offerings after having given birth, offering prayers and thanks to God (see Targum Yonasan ad loc.), and this is surely the Targum’s inspiration for this explanation.

But what of the relationship between the women and these mirrors? From the Targum, it seems that these donations were not related to the pre-Mishkan times, linked to a desire to abandon these women’s preoccupation with their physical appearance as a means of coming closer to God in their prayers outside of Moshe’s tent (see Sh’mos 33:4, and the corresponding comments of the Targum Yerushalmi); rather, they were spurred by some sort of future need, that would arise when they would go to bring their chattas and olah offerings.

What was this need? Why, according to the Targum, did they pledge these mirrors? Clearly, from the end of the Targum’s explanation, the fact that they would (hopefully) go home afterwards and give birth to righteous children would seem to indicate that these mirrors were used for purposes of self-beautification. If we understand the cryptic word “admusshon” as in fact “a-d’musshon”, i.e. “over their appearances”, then we can understand the Targum as saying that they donated the mirrors in order that they should be able to make themselves attractive for their husbands even as they brought their sacrifices. A similar idea, of course, is expressed in the Midrash Tanchuma (P’kudei #9), which is (mis)quoted in Rashi in his comments on our verse.

This is not, of course, and argument in favour of doing one’s hair in the middle of Sh’moneh Esrei. But it certainly does seem to suggest that dressing up nicely – as long as it is done tastefully and “chastely”, as the Targum tells us – and going to shul is not something to be frowned upon either.

Ephraim Stulberg on Vayakhel, 5764

At the beginning of the parasha, Hashem commands Moshe once again regarding the prohibition of performing “melacha” on Shabbos. At the end of this brief passage, we are introduced to a specific prohibition: “You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings on the Shabbos” (Sh’mos 35:3). This rare mention of one of the 39 cardinal melachos of Shabbos is the subject of much discussion amongst the commentaries, and by analysing their explanations as to why kindling, of all the melachos, should have been singled out by the Torah, perhaps we shall see if we can come to an understanding of the nature of this melacha.

There are essentially two schools of thought regarding kindling. One group of commentators seems to feel that kindling fire is the very quintessence of the sorts of melachos prohibited by the Torah. Rabbeinu Bachya notes that aside from kindling itself, there are many other categories of melacha which involve the use of a fire. It is for that reason, he writes, that we usher in the new week, and our new permission to perform melacha, with the kindling of a fire at havdalah. Lighting a fire is the epitome of melacha.

Turning this line of reasoning on its head, several of the Tosafists note that kindling does not seem to be a melacha at all, but merely a preparation for the performance of other melachos. As such, if the Torah had not specified it, one might have thought it was okay to prepare the fire on Shabbos for use on Saturday night. S’forno writes that kindling usually involves destruction, and thus might not have been included in forbidden melachos, had the Torah not singled it out. Ibn Ezra and Ramban write that one might have thought that kindling was not a forbidden act at all, since it is closely related to the preparation of food, or what is known in rabbinic literature as “m’leches ochel nefesh”. Since the Torah only prohibits “melacha” - and not “kol melacha” - in P’ Vayakhel, we might have thought that food-related actions, which are not pure “melacha”, would be permissible. Ramban gives two reasons why kindling is intrinsically a “m’leches ochel nefesh”: fire is necessary for preparing most foods, and the sensual benefit one derives from the act of kindling is more immediate than even that derived from cooking.

As Rav Hirsch points out, these two fundamentally opposite ways of looking at the melacha of kindling also express themselves in the well-known argument between R’ Yose and R’ Nassan (Shabbos 70a). R’ Nassan felt that kindling fire was specified by the Torah as a sort of archetype for all the other melachos. Just as one is liable if he performs even this single action which is prohibited on Shabbos, so also is one equally liable if one profanes the Shabbos by acting out any of the other melachos: one need not perform all, or even several of the melachos to be guilty. This explanation of R’ Nassan is based on the principle that anything which was included in the general category, and was then singled out for something, serves as a template for all the rest of the items within that category in that regard. (This is one of the 13 Principles of R’ Yishmael.) R’ Yose, however, holds that kindling is singled out by the Torah as an exception to the rule. While for any other Shabbos violation, the penalty is stoning, if committed willfully in front of witnesses, or a guilt offering (“chattas”) if done accidentally, kindling is subject merely to a punishment of flogging. R’ Nassan, writes Rav Hirsch, believed that kindling was a melacha par excellence, and thus was highly suitable to serve as the template for all the other melachos, while R’ Yose felt that lighting a fire might perhaps be a melacha, but surely of a lesser grade than the others, whether because it is generally destructive, preparatory, or food-related. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Tosafos (P’sachim 5b) point out that according to R’ Yose, there is no prohibition against kindling on Yom Tov at all, since it does not fall under the category of “melacha” at all.[1] Likewise, Avnei Neizer (O.C. 226) entertains the possibility that according to R’ Yose, kindling has no “tolados”, no logically analogous offshoots, as it is a prohibition sui generis.

There is much more that could be written on this subject, but it will have to wait for another time.

[1] A parallel argument appears in the Mechilta (Bo, end ch. 6). The Tanna Kamma writes that we need a special verse to tell us that the burning of kodashim is prohibited on Yom Tov; R’ Yishma’el counters by saying that there is no need for such a verse, as burning things is “the quintessence of melacha.” Malbim explains that R’ Yishma’el agrees with R’ Nassan, while the Tanna Kamma follows the reasoning of R’ Yose.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Hand, n. A singular instrument worn at the end of a human arm and commonly thrust into somebody's pocket.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"If you guys don't behave, I'll send you to the main office."

- MD [main office?!]

The Blog would like to welcome Maxiebaby & Wife back to the Continent.

I guess that means you're incontinent.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"I better show it inside, otherwise people will not believe me, and think I'm some kind of fundamentalist."

- RBP, re. a chumra

From The Devil's Dictionary

Halo, n. Properly, a luminous ring encircling an astronomical body, but not infrequently confounded with "aureola," or "nimbus," a somewhat similar phenomenon worn as a head-dress by divinities and saints. The halo is a purely optical illusion, produced by moisture in the air, in the manner of a rainbow; but the aureola is conferred as a sign of superior sanctity, in the same way as a bishop's mitre, or the Pope's tiara. In the painting of the Nativity, by Szedgkin, a pious artist of Pesth, not only do the Virgin and the Child wear the nimbus, but an ass nibbling hay from the sacred manger is similarly decorated and, to his lasting honor be it said, appears to bear his unaccustomed dignity with a truly saintly grace.

Astrodome

"This is a tough yard for the hitter when the air conditioner is blowing in."

- Bob Boone

Challenge

Name a French plural noun whose letters, in reverse order, spell the English translation of the noun's singular.

(For example, "livres" would be such a French plural noun, if only "servil" were an English word meaning "book.")

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Don't speak to me. Speak to Mrs. Richardson. She'll kill you."

- JS Sr., re. retyping OUAC application form

From The Devil's Dictionary

Half, n. One of two equal parts into which a thing may be divided, or considered as divided. In the fourteenth century a heated discussion arose among theologists and philosophers as to whether Omniscience could part an object into three halves; and the pious Father Aldrovinus publicly prayed in the cathedral at Rouen that God would demonstrate the affirmative of the proposition in some signal and unmistakable way, and particularly (if it should please Him) upon the body of that hardy blasphemer, Manutius Procinus, who maintained the negative. Procinus, however, was spared to die of the bite of a viper.

You'd better update your system...

I just made a post to my other blog, and ran a spellcheck before posting it. You'll never guess what word it claimed was a spelling error. It was 'BLOG'!!!! The host site is called BLOGGER, and it's entire purpose is to host BLOGS! That's like running spellcheck in Word and getting an error over the word Microsoft.

The Unauthorized Dark Lord's Dictionary

Inflammable, adj. Flammable.

Ephraim Stulberg on Vayakhel, 5765

After God tells Moshe that the Tabernacle and all its accoutrements are to be made by Betzalel, Ahaliav and their associates, he tells him that the Jews will also have to observe Shabbos. “Ach es Shabsosai tishmoru,” he has Moshe tell the people (31:13). Rashi, noting the word “ach”, cites the well-known principle that whenever the Torah says “ach” or “raq”, it means to exclude something. He explains that the Torah is coming to tell us that even the construction of the Tabernacle is not to override the prohibition against performing melacha actions on Shabbos. Rashi adopts a similar interpretation of “ach” in his commentary on B’midbar (31:22). After telling the Jews how to make the vessels plundered in the Midyanite War tehorim, Elazar tells the people “Ach es ha-zahav, etc.” should be koshered as well. “‘Ach’ is an expression of exclusion,” writes Rashi. “You are excluded from using these vessels even after you have purified them from the impurity of death, until you purifiy them from what they have swallowed of non-kosher foods.”

Ramban, as is his wont, argues with Rashi. True, he writes, “ach” always comes to exclude something; but it does not mean to exclude from that which is stated previously, but rather to diminish its subject itself. This is why this word, which seems at first glance to be a conjunction (“but”) is found so often at the beginning of a verse or statement. “Ach” does not come to minimize anything concerning the building of the Tabernacle, i.e. the time in which in which it may be worked on, but rather it comes to modify the seemingly universal obligation to guard the Sabbath. Indeed, he cites a gemara (Yerushalmi Yoma 8:5) which cites our verse as a source for the principle that to save a life, one may perform actions usually prohibited on Shabbos.

Does Ramban’s principle hold up? Is what he is saying universally true? The word “ach” occurs 43 times in the Torah (i.e. Pentateuch). Here they are, along with the drashos that I found concerning those words:

B’reishis 7:23 “Ach Noah”: that Noah was injured (lit. “not complete”) and unfit to bring sacrifices (Tanchuma Noah #9)
9:4 “Ach basar b’nafsho damo”: But you may eat the flesh of a living sheretz (Sanhedrin 59b).
9:5 “V’ach es dimchem l’nafshoseichem edrosh”: This excludes someone who takes his life in order to sanctify God, or because he is afraid of being tortured (B’reishis Rabbah 34:13, as explained by Da’as Z’keinim mi-ba’alei ha-Tosafos)
18:32
20:12
23:13
26:9 “Ach hinei isht’cha”: But he didn’t actually see him acting with her as though she were his wife (Tosafos Ha-shalem v. 3, p. 42)
27:13 “Ach sh’ma b’koli”: But don’t listen to me if my commands conflict with those of your father (Tosafos Ha-shalem, v. 3, p. 63).
27:30 “Ach yatzo yatza Ya’akov”: He was going out, but didn’t quite get out (B’reishis Rabbah 65:5).
29:14 “Ach atzmi u-vsari ata”: He didn’t really feel that close to him (Tosafos Ha-shalem v. 3, p. 136).
34:15
34:22
34:23
44:28

Sh’mos 10:17
12:15 “Ach bayom ha-rishon tashbisu s’or”. “Ach: chalak”: this means that the leaven had to be gone even before the first day (P’sachim 5a)
12:16 “Ach asher ye’achel le-chol nefesh”: comes to exclude certain types of food-related activities (Yerushalmi Beitzah 1:10)
21:21
31:13 “Ach es Shabsosai”: comes to exclude life-saving from the prohibition (Mechilta, Yoma 85b, Yerushalmi Yoma 8:5).

Vayikra 11:4
11:21
11:36 “Ach ma’yan u-vor”: teaches that one who performs ablution in even the smallest of springs is tahor (Sifra, according to Malbim.)
21:23 ‘Ach el ha-paroches lo yavo”: but he may go there to carry out repairs, i.e. things which are not actual “avoda” (Eiruvin 105a)
23:27 “Ach be-asor la-chodesh ha-sh’vi’I”: Yom Kippur atones only for those who repent (Sh’vuos 13a).
23:39 “Ach ba-chamisha asar yom…tachogu es chag Hashem”: But no chaggigah offerings on Shabbos (Sifra, Yerushalmi Chaggigah 1:6).
27:26
27:28 “Ach kol cherem”: But he may not make all his property a “cherem” (Sifra).

B’midbar 1:49
12:2
14:9
18:3
18:15 “Ach pado sifdeh”: But don’t redeem the first-born who was killed within the first 30 days (Bava Kama 11b).
18:17 “Ach b’chor shor”: But not if it only has some of the traits of its mother (B’choros 5b).
22:20
26:55 “Ach b’goral yeichaleik”: But the territories of Yehoshua and Calev were not subject to lotteries (Bava Basra 122a).
31:22 “Ach es ha-zahav”: Only the gold, i.e. the metal itself. But the rust must be removed first (Sifrei).
31:23 “Ach b’mei niddah yischata”: Teaches that it doesn’t need to be sprinkled on the 3rd and 7th days with the “mei niddah” associated with one who touches a corpse; rather, the “mei niddah” mentioned here is of a lesser degree, meaning a single immersion in the water in which a niddah immerses herself (Avoda Zara 75b).
36:6

D’varim 12:22
14:7
16:15 “Ach same’ach”: Comes to exclude the eighth day from the requirement to sacrifice animals as “shalmei simcha”; one may use yesterday’s leftovers (Succah 48a, as explained by the G”RA).
18:20
28:29

All these examples would clearly seem to indicate that the word “ach” is not really meant as a conjunction, but rather as a term used by the Torah to modify its subject. Ramban seems to change his tune later on (see Vayikra 23:27), explaining “ach” in a manner similar to Rashi’s. But in general, the midrashim all seem to explain in the way that Ramban explains it in our parasha.

Ephraim Stulberg on Ki Tisa, 5766

The Mishnah (Megilla 4:10) lists a small group of verses which are “read, but not translated” in the synagogue service. The usual Aramaic targum was dispensed with out of a concern not to broadcast some of the more embarrassing moments in biblical history to the unlettered masses. One of the members of this select group of verses is described as the “second account of the [golden] calf.” There are numerous variations on the question of which verses might be included under this rubric, both in more traditional Jewish sources and in manuscripts of the various targumim. Prof Michael Klein of Hebrew Union College, in an article I have cited previously, gives a rundown of the different versions, and I have decided to compile them into a table, along with some additional sources not included by Klein in his article. But before we begin, it will be useful to extract the relevant section of the Torah:

פרק לב
יז וַיִּשְׁמַע יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֶת- קוֹל הָעָם בְּרֵעֹה וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל-משֶׁה קוֹל מִלְחָמָה בַּמַּחֲנֶה: יח וַיֹּאמֶר אֵין קוֹל עֲנוֹת גְּבוּרָה וְאֵין קוֹל עֲנוֹת חֲלוּשָׁה קוֹל עַנּוֹת אָנֹכִי שֹׁמֵעַ: יט וַיְהִי כַּאֲשֶׁר קָרַב אֶל-הַמַּחֲנֶה וַיַּרְא אֶת-הָעֵגֶל וּמְחֹלֹת וַיִּחַר-אַף משֶׁה וַיַּשְׁלֵךְ מִיָּדָו אֶת- הַלֻּחֹת וַיְשַׁבֵּר אֹתָם תַּחַת הָהָר: כ וַיִּקַּח אֶת-הָעֵגֶל אֲשֶׁר עָשׂוּ וַיִּשְׂרֹף בָּאֵשׁ וַיִּטְחַן עַד אֲשֶׁר-דָּק וַיִּזֶר עַל-פְּנֵי הַמַּיִם וַיַּשְׁק אֶת-בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל: כא וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל-אַהֲרֹן מֶה-עָשָׂה לְךָ הָעָם הַזֶּה כִּי-הֵבֵאתָ עָלָיו חֲטָאָה גְדֹלָה: כב וַיֹּאמֶר אַהֲרֹן אַל-יִחַר אַף אֲדֹנִי אַתָּה יָדַעְתָּ אֶת-הָעָם כִּי בְרָע הוּא: כג וַיֹּאמְרוּ לִי עֲשֵׂה-לָנוּ אֱלֹהִים אֲשֶׁר יֵלְכוּ לְפָנֵינוּ כִּי-זֶה משֶׁה הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר הֶעֱלָנוּ מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם לֹא יָדַעְנוּ מֶה-הָיָה לוֹ: כד וָאֹמַר לָהֶם לְמִי זָהָב הִתְפָּרָקוּ וַיִּתְּנוּ-לִי וָאַשְׁלִכֵהוּ בָאֵשׁ וַיֵּצֵא הָעֵגֶל הַזֶּה: כה וַיַּרְא משֶׁה אֶת-הָעָם כִּי פָרֻעַ הוּא כִּי-פְרָעֹה אַהֲרֹן לְשִׁמְצָה בְּקָמֵיהֶם: כו וַיַּעֲמֹד משֶׁה בְּשַׁעַר הַמַּחֲנֶה וַיֹּאמֶר מִי לַיהוָֹה אֵלָי וַיֵּאָסְפוּ אֵלָיו כָּל-בְּנֵי לֵוִי: כז וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם כֹּה-אָמַר יְהוָֹה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל שִׂימוּ אִישׁ-חַרְבּוֹ עַל-יְרֵכוֹ עִבְרוּ וָשׁוּבוּ מִשַּׁעַר לָשַׁעַר בַּמַּחֲנֶה וְהִרְגוּ אִישׁ-אֶת- אָחִיו וְאִישׁ אֶת-רֵעֵהוּ וְאִישׁ אֶת-קְרֹבוֹ: כח וַיַּעֲשׂוּ בְנֵי-לֵוִי כִּדְבַר משֶׁה וַיִּפֹּל מִן-הָעָם בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא כִּשְׁלשֶׁת אַלְפֵי אִישׁ: כט וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה מִלְאוּ יֶדְכֶם הַיּוֹם לַיהֹוָה כִּי אִישׁ בִּבְנוֹ וּבְאָחִיו וְלָתֵת עֲלֵיכֶם הַיּוֹם בְּרָכָה: ל וַיְהִי מִמָּחֳרָת וַיֹּאמֶר משֶׁה אֶל-הָעָם אַתֶּם חֲטָאתֶם חֲטָאָה גְדֹלָה וְעַתָּה אֶעֱלֶה אֶל-יְהֹוָה אוּלַי אֲכַפְּרָה בְּעַד חַטַּאתְכֶם: לא וַיָּשָׁב משֶׁה אֶל-יְהוָֹה וַיֹּאמַר אָנָּא חָטָא הָעָם הַזֶּה חֲטָאָה גְדֹלָה וַיַּעֲשׂוּ לָהֶם אֱלֹהֵי זָהָב: לב וְעַתָּה אִם-תִּשָּׂא חַטָּאתָם וְאִם-אַיִן מְחֵנִי נָא מִסִּפְרְךָ אֲשֶׁר כָּתָבְתָּ: לג וַיֹּאמֶר יְהֹוָה אֶל-משֶׁה מִי אֲשֶׁר חָטָא-לִי אֶמְחֶנּוּ מִסִּפְרִי: לד וְעַתָּה לֵךְ נְחֵה אֶת-הָעָם אֶל אֲשֶׁר-דִּבַּרְתִּי לָךְ הִנֵּה מַלְאָכִי יֵלֵךְ לְפָנֶיךָ וּבְיוֹם פָּקְדִי וּפָקַדְתִּי עֲלֵהֶם חַטָּאתָם: לה וַיִּגֹּף יְהוָֹה אֶת-הָעָם עַל אֲשֶׁר עָשׂוּ אֶת-הָעֵגֶל אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה אַהֲרֹן:

סידור ר' סעדיה גאון - הוצ' אסף
י"ט-כ כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה כ"ז-כ"ט ל'-ל"ד ל"ה
תרגום אונקלוס - כ"י ב
כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה ל"ה
תרגום אונקלוס - כ"י א
כ"ב-כ"ה ל'-ל"ד ל"ה
תלמוד בבלי - מגילה כה, ב
כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה ובפרט פסוק כ"ד
תלמוד ירושלמי, לדעת ר' אבא
כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה ל"ה
תלמוד ירושלמי, לדעת רב
כ"ב-כ"ה
תלמוד ירושלמי, לדעת ריב"ל
כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה
תוספתא מגילה ד' ל"ו
כ"א כ"ב-כ"ה ל"ה

In addition to these, we also have the Targum Neofyti, which avoids translating the word for ‘to make’ in the context of verses 1, 4, 8, 20 (the entire verse goes untranslated), 23, 31, 35, as well as avoids making explicit mention of the scene witnessed by Moses (v. 19) and the actual act of forming the calf (v. 24).

All of this is no doubt very interesting –well, to me it is – but what does it really tell us?

There are a couple of different explanations given for why the mishnah prohibits translating the “second account” in public. Rashi writes that were we to give a literal rendering of these verses, the impression would be given that the calf that emerged from the fire was something more than a mere statue crafted from a mould (and thus contrary to how it is described in the “first account” (verse 2)). In the second account, Aharon says simply that he threw all the gold into the fire “and this calf emerged” (v. 24), implying that it had a life of its own and that there was some very powerful force involved in creating the shape.

Tosafos dispute Rashi’s understanding, arguing that the specific verses listed in the gemara as being prohibited do not appear to reflect such a concern. Rather, they argue that the mishnah’s concern is for the honour of Aharon, as a simple reading of the text yields serious questions as to the propriety of Aharon’s conduct during the episode.

When we examine the various sets of instructions summarized in the chart above, we find that both of these views are reflected in our records of meturgemanic practice. On the one hand, the Tosefta, as well as the third Yerushalmi version, both of which single out verse 35, appear to be acutely sensitive to the issue mentioned by Tosafos. The verses they mention all contain reference to Aharon’s actions during the affair. Verse 21 is added on according by some simply in order not to leave the listener hanging, having heard Moshe’s question without hearing an Aramaicized answer.

The Targum Onkelos manuscript seems concerned not only with the honour of Aharon, but indeed with that of the nation as a whole. Verses 30-35 all mention the fact that the Jews have “sinned”.

Targum Neofyti, on the other hand, addresses the issue raised by Rashi. The ‘making’ of the idol goes untranslated, both in the first account and in the second and this seems to speak to a degree of reluctance on the part of the meturgeman to describe just how the calf was formed.

The opinion of R. Saadya Gaon is most interesting. Saadya understands the idea of the “second account” as commencing as soon as Moshe comes into the camp and finds the revelers prancing around their new deity. Indeed, according to him it is not so much a second “account”, but rather the point at which the Torah’s narrative revisits the camp scene that is referred to. As the mishnah’s precise words are “the second act of the calf”, there is no difficulty with this reading. He omits the entire section, with the exception of verse 26, for some strange reason. Presumably, the idea is to properly conclude the story in the least defamatory manner possible. The end of the bowdlerized version is that Moshe is upset, but nothing really happens, other than we find out that it is the Levites who are the most loyal followers of God. They all presumably live happily ever after.

er, Shabbas Shalom ?

Belated Mazel Tov

To Yossi and Shifra Levy on their wedding.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Hag, n. An elderly lady whom you do not happen to like; sometimes called, also, a hen, or cat. Old witches, sorceresses, etc., were called hags from the belief that their heads were surrounded by a kind of baleful lumination or nimbus - hag being the popular name of that peculiar electrical light sometimes observed in the hair. At one time hag was not a word of reproach: Drayton speaks of a "beautiful hag, all smiles," much as Shakespeare said, "sweet wench." It would not now be proper to call your sweetheart a hag - that compliment is reserved for the use of her grandchildren.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"It's like, Iran should say, 'We put the "fun" back in "fundamentalism".'"

- MF the Elder

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Oh muy Gad... this guy..."

-MH, with palm to forehead, chuckling

From The Devil's Dictionary

Habit, n. A shackle for the free.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"You know, guys, Rosh comes right after the Gemara. Remember, you can't learn Gemara without a Rosh."

- RBP

From The Devil's Dictionary

Gunpowder, n. An agency employed by civilized nations for the settlement of disputes which might become troublesome if left unadjusted. By most writers the invention of gunpowder is ascribed to the Chinese, but not upon very convincing evidence. Milton says it was invented by the devil to dispel angels with, and this opinion seems to derive some support from the scarcity of angels. Moreover, it has the hearty concurrence of the Hon. James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture.

Secretary Wilson became interested in gunpowder through an event that occurred on the Government experimental farm in the District of Columbia. One day, several years ago, a rogue imperfectly reverent of the Secretary's profound attainments and personal character presented him with a sack of gunpowder, representing it as the seed of the Flashawful flabbergastor, a Patagonian cereal of great commercial value, admirably adapted to this climate. The good Secretary was instructed to spill it along in a furrow and afterward inhume it with soil. This he at once proceeded to do, and had made a continuous line of it all the way across a ten-acre field, when he was made to look backward by a shout from the generous donor, who at once dropped a lighted match into the furrow at the starting-point. Contact with the earth had somewhat dampened the powder, but the startled functionary saw himself pursued by a tall moving pillar of fire and smoke in fierce evolution. He stood for a moment paralyzed and speechless, then he recollected an engagement and, dropping all, absented himself thence with such surprising celerity that to the eyes of spectators along the route selected he appeared like a long, dim streak prolonging itself with inconceivable rapidity through several villages, and audibly refusing to be comforted. "Great Scott! what is that?" cried a surveyor's chainman, shading his eyes and gazing at the fading line of agriculturist which bisected his visible horizon. "That," said the surveyor, carelessly glancing at the phenomenon and again centering his attention upon his instrument, "is the Meridian of Washington."

Quote

"I don't know how close we came, but the lady in 13D in the other plane was having the chicken dinner."

- Jim Sundberg, after his plane nearly collided with another plane

Update to Sources Indicating that Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge

I have added Rabbi Shlomo Fisher to this post on the advice of an esteemed friend of mine, who will try to send me the documentation.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"You know something? There's debris on the flippin' lens."

- EA, ticked off at microscope

From The Devil's Dictionary

Guillotine, n. A machine which makes a Frenchman shrug his shoulders with good reason.

In his great work on Divergent Lines of Racial Evolution, the learned Professor Brayfugle argues from the prevalence of this gesture - the shrug - among Frenchmen, that they are descended from turtles and it is simply a survival of the habit of retracting the head inside the shell. It is with reluctance that I differ with so eminent an authority, but in my judgment (as more elaborately set forth and enforced in my work entitled Hereditary Emotions - lib. II, c. XI) the shrug is a poor foundation upon which to build so important a theory, for previously to the Revolution the gesture was unknown. I have not a doubt that it is directly referable to the terror inspired by the guillotine during the period of that instrument's activity.

A Confused Fellow

First of all, it's very sad and all that his family was killed by ninjas, but why did he draw all those smiley faces on the bottom of his sign? Also, why doesn't he just ask for a gun, it would be much easier than mastering kung-fu. It's not like he's starring in some martial arts movie where the bad guys kill the main character's family, so he learns martial arts in order to gain revenge. This is real life we are talking about here! Anyhow, I wish the man luck in his quest to hunt down those ninjas, but I think that maybe approaching the police might be a better solution. Poor fellow, he seems rather confused.

Amazing!

This is an awesome bit! Make sure you have your sound on...

http://marketplace.espeakers.com/movie.php?sid=5290&aid=10558

Enjoy!
Rotes, The Mrs.

Purim Fun

This past Shushan Purim, the good Captain and I visited our mashgiach and (drunkenly) presented him with a fine smattering of operatic parody.

The following is sung to the tune of "When a felon's not engaged in his employment," by Gilbert and Sullivan:

When a kofer's not engaged in his employment -His employment
Or maturing his heretical 'a plans –'cal 'a plans,
His capacity for innocent enjoyment –'Cent enjoyment
Is just as great as a Chareidi man's –'reidi man's.

Our feelings we with difficulty smother – 'Culty smother,
When the kannoim's duty's to be done -To be done.
Ah, take one consideration with another –With another,
A chareidi's lot is not a happy one. -happy one.

When the kofer's not a great mesorah burning, -'sorah burning
When the mumar isn't occupied in crime –'Pied in crime,
He loves to do a little Tosfos learning –Tosfos learning,
And study Torah just to pass the time –'pass the time...

When the mumar's done betraying his brother –his brother,
He loves to lie a-basking in the sun –In the sun.
Ah, take one consideration with another –With another,
A chareidi's lot is not a happy one.

When kannoim's duty's to be done, to be done,
A chareidi's lot is not a happy one, happy one.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Grave, n. A place in which the dead are laid to await the coming of the medical student.

Beside a lonely grave I stood -
With brambles 'twas encumbered;
The winds were moaning in the wood,
Unheard by him who slumbered.

A rustic standing near, I said:
"He cannot hear it blowing!"
"'Course not," said he: "the feller's dead -
He can't hear nowt that's going."

"Too true," I said; "alas, too true -
No sound his sense can quicken!"
"Well, mister, wot is that to you? -
The deadster ain't a-kickin'."

I knelt and prayed: "O Father, smile
On him, and mercy show him!"
That countryman looked on the while,
And said: "You didn't know him."

Pobeter Dunk.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"You're putting nails in my brain."

- CL

Ephraim Stulberg on Ki Tisa, 5764

There is a propitious coincidence in the timing of Purim this year, falling out as it does in the week of Parashas Ki Sisa. The gemara (Shabbos 88a) explains that when the Jews first accepted the Torah at Sinai, they were compelled to do so. Only in the time of Achashverosh, in the time of Purim, did they accept it of their own free will. The Midrash Tanchuma (Noach 3) explains that the forced acceptance of the Torah at Sinai referred to by the gemara was that of the Oral Torah, not the Written, to which they gladly replied "na'aseh ve'nishma". Because of its many intricacies and the difficulty in learning and acquiring it, the Jews were reluctant to accept the Oral Torah at first. The revelation at Sinai was a time of open miracles, and it was only the Written Torah, which would be self-evident even to future generations in its legitimacy, that the Jews were willing to accept there. It wasn't until the time of the Purim miracle, when the Jews accurately perceived the more subtle workings of Hashem, that they were able to accept the Oral Torah, secure in their self-knowledge that they would never reject it, no matter how much its provenance might be questioned.

The gemara (Gittin 60b) finds a reference for the distinction between the Written and Oral Toros in this week's parasha. The verse says: "And Hashem said to Moshe, "Write for yourself these words, for through (lit. "by the mouth of") these words, I have established a covenant with you and with Israel" (Sh'mos 34:27). We see that the verse refers to two types of words: those which are written, and those which are spoken, studied orally ("by the mouth"). The gemara establishes from this verse the general rule that the words which were given in writing must not be studied by heart, while those which were transmitted orally are not to be recorded. (See the commentary of the Chassam Sofer on this verse, where he explains the mechanics of this interpretation.)

There are essentially three reasons given by the Rabbinic sources behind the division of the Torah into a Written and an Oral section, three attempts at explaining why it wasn't all simply recorded. The gemara (Eiruvin 21b) bases its explanation on a verse at the end of Koheles, which states that "in the making of multitudes of books there is no end" (12:12). The Torah is simply so vast, indeed constantly expanding with each new insight. To write down a definitive text encompassing all of the Torah, in explicit form, would be impossible, especially since new circumstances require new legislation (see Sefer Ha'Ikarim Sect. 3 Ch. 23); while to record everything implicitly, the Written Torah received by Moshe is already sufficient. Moreover, as Maharsha notes in his Chiddushei Aggados (Gittin 60b), by coming up with a canonical Torah text, one would stunt research, and the need for analysis would go unfulfilled, as the populace would be satisfied with their Daf Yomi. However, once R' Yehuda Ha'nassi realized that even the current body of Torah knowledge was on the verge of being lost, he decided to record the Mishnah, even at the risk of losing the further insights which might have been gained through a more active research. This, he writes, is the meaning of the verse "eis la'asos la'shem, etc.": in certain circumstances, we must be willing to sacrifice future Torah insights for the sake of maintaining the core body of knowledge.

(N.B. While this source in Eiruvin is presented in some works as referring to the Oral Torah as a whole (see Gur Aryeh on Sh'mos 34:27), in fact from the commentaries on the gemara - Rashi, Tosafos - it appears to be referring only to laws of purely rabbinic nature: their decrees, institutions, etc. This interpretation also seems fairly explicit in the gemara. It is by no means necessarily the case that the Oral Torah, in its more limited sense - including only the laws and interpretations actually given to Moshe at Sinai, which have a biblical status (see Ramban's critique of Sefer Hamitzvos, rule#2) - is so infinitely broad: see the argument in Gittin 60b as to which is larger, the Oral or Written Torah.)

A second explanation for this division of the Torah is recorded in a number of places in the Yerushalmi (Pe'ah 2:4, Megillah 4:1, Chaggigah 1:8). The prophet (Hosea 8:12) records Hashem's comment to the Jews: "Shall I write for him the majority of my Torah? They will be like a stranger." If theTorah were written down, it would be just another constitution. "What would differentiate the Jews from the gentiles? These [people] take out their own law-books, and these take out theirs," writes the Yerushalmi. It is for this reason that the Oral Torah is more precious than its Written counterpart. The novelty of an Oral constitution, transmitted from generation to generation, is one of the unique characteristics of the Jews.

The midrashim take a slightly different angle on the matter. The Tanchuma (Vayera 5) writes that Hashem foresaw that the Torah would eventually be translated into Greek (see Megillah 9a), and would thus become known to the nations. The Jews would thus lose their special place in the world, as their Torah would become public knowledge. Therefore, He kept the key to properly understanding the Torah hidden. "For the Mishnah is the hidden treasure of Hashem, which He reveals only to the righteous, as it is written: "The secret of Hashem is for those who fear Him" (Tehillim 25)." As the Midrash Rabbah adds (Sh'mos 47:1), when Moshe asked Hashem if he should write down the Oral Torah, which he had just spent forty days and nights studying (see Ba'al Ha'turim on Sh'mos 34:27), he was told that if the gentiles would end up translating the Oral Torah, they would be in the same elect position as the Jews - or so they would claim. Therefore he hid the key to understanding the Torah, to be passed down orally. Indeed, as the Netziv proves in his commentary on the Torah (Vayikra 18:5 (Harchev Davar 1)), it was always Hashem's intention to transmit the Written Torah to the non-Jews. However, the Oral Torah was always to remain the exclusive property of the Jews.

The parameters of this law against writing down the Oral Torah are rather hazy, far more so than the prohibition against reciting passages from the Written Torah by memory, which is elaborated upon in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 49) and in other places. While it is not our purpose here to present an exhaustive discussion of these details, it is worthwhile to ponder the words of Rambam in his introduction to his legal code, Yad Hachazaka. Discussing the decision of R' Yehudah Ha'nassi to set down the Mishna in writing, Rambam writes: "And from the days of Moshe until those of Rabbeinu Hakadosh, no one compiled a work from which the masses could learn the Oral Torah; rather in each generation the head of the Court or the prophet of that generation would write for himself a record of the teachings which he had heard from his teachers, and he would relay that orally to the masses, and each person would then write to himself according to his talents and abilities the explanations and laws of the Torah which he had heard." It is not clear where Rambamgets this distinction between the recording of the Oral Torah for one's own private use, which was permitted, and the teaching from such notes, which was prohibited. While other scholars have picked up on this distinction as being evident from the Talmudic sources themselves - see the introduction of the Netziv to his commentary on the She'iltos (Kidmas Ha'emek 3:10), as well as the alternate reading of the Shita Mekubetzes on T'murah 14b (note 4): "The rabbis rely on what they've learned, but since there is a fear of forgetting, they write it down and leave it, and if they forget they look in the book" - it isn't clear what this is ultimately based on.

The solution to our dilemma is to be found in another of Rambam's works, Moreh Ha'nevuchim (Section I, Ch. 71), where he writes that the reason that we were given an Oral Torah at all, and that the entire Torah was not written down, was that if it had been recorded it would have been subject to conflicting schools of textual analysis. Therefore, it was transmitted from person to person by the leaders of each generation. This is the reason for the prohibition of studying the Oral Torah out of a text. If one is not privy to the tradition, if one has not actually heard the law from the mouth of a sage, the text will seem vague and capable of multiple interpretations. However, once one has heard something from a sage he can rely on himself to record it faithfully and in the sense that was intended by his teacher. (This is also the view of Ritva in Gittin. See the commentary of Rav Hirsch on the Torah (Sh'mos 34:27, who elaborates on this theme, bringing an example from Sanhedrin 35a.) With this we can also answer the question of Mahara"Tz Chayes, who is troubled by the assertion of the Rambam in his introduction to Seder Z'ra'im, that when the Jews received the interpretations of the commandments from Moshe, they recorded them in scrolls. This recording of the Oral interpretation was permitted, since it was for personal use, and based initially on an oral rendering. (As a side point, if one looks at the Kappach translation of this passage of Rambam from the Arabic, one sees that the Rambam was actually referring to the recording of the Written portion of the commandments. Thus the question is baseless.)

As well, the concept of the "megillas s'tarim", the "hidden scroll", referred to in Shabbos 6b, becomes a little clearer. These were not contraband copies of collections of oral laws illegally recorded; rather, they were shorthand records of novel legal opinions which had been overheard from a single party, meant only for the personal use of their compiler, who knew the true meaning of the notes. When such a scroll was discovered by Rav, it necessarily caused him much confusion, and indeed the gemara has great difficulty in determining the meaning of the cryptic scroll.

There are several implications to this explanation of this rule. For starters it would seem that there is absolutely no point in memorizing a section of gemara so that one can learn it without referring back to the text. There seems to be nothing to gain from such an approach, since one is initially learning from a text in any case. Similarly, if one hears a sermon or shiur from a Rabbi there would seem to be nothing wrong with writing it down since one could count on oneself to accurately record the spoken words of the teacher. It would seem that nowadays the only real prohibition against writing down words of Torah not previously written would be to do so in order to teach others from them, such as this email. But I suppose it is too late now.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Kaiserman... sit, leave, or duct tape - take your choice."

- SG

From The Devil's Dictionary

Grammar, n. A system of pitfalls thoughtfully prepared for the feet of the self-made man, along the path by which he advances to distinction.

Beware the Ides of March!

QUOTI Question

I have a very serious question regarding the attribution system for QUOTIs, both in the original Yearbook and therefore in this Blog:

If the initials RBC include his title, first and last names, then, by analogy, shouldn't RBP really be REBP? Why is REBP the only person whose first name intial is never referenced in the QUOTI attributions?

Incidentally, has anyone noticed the comment I posted to the "Orthodoxy Test #16" post?

I dressed up as Einstein for Purim. Why? Because apparently, Einstein's birthday was March 14, so I thought it was appropriate. The other possibility would have been to dress up as Pi, since March 14 is known by mathematicians as Pi Day (3/14). But that posed a moral dilemma, as it is based on the numbering of secular months, which the Chatam Sofer recommends against as it may be in violation of "Hachodesh hazze lachem rosh chodashim", that is, Nisan should be the first month, not January. So I didn't, even though I do have a Pi costume that I've used in the past for Purim.

Thank you very much, Gavi Stulberg

For helping me deliver JET shalach manos today.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Goose, n. A bird that supplies quills for writing. These, by some occult process of nature, are penetrated and suffused with various degrees of the bird's intellectual energies and emotional character, so that when inked and drawn mechanically across paper by a person called an "author," there results a very fair and accurate transcript of the fowl's thought and feeling. The difference in geese, as discovered by this ingenious method, is considerable: many are found to have only trivial and insignificant powers, but some are seen to be very great geese indeed.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"But you can't do that; I mean, that's what we do, actually."

- VD

Banned!

Maxiebaby and Captain Salamander pay a Purim visit to their favourite author. (Click to enlarge).

Landmark Move for Sesame Street

After more than 4000 episodes and 36 seasons, Sesame Street is making a bold move this week. Writers and producers of the show have decided to kill off a character for the first time. It's widely believed that Big Bird is the one who is going to be killed off. "His popularity has plummeted ever since the bird flu crisis, and it started to have a negative effect on our ratings" said someone involved with show, on the condition of anonymity. While it is not known how they'll eliminate Big Bird, sources indicate that the screencap pictured below is from the landmark episode set to air sometime this week.

Blog Grammen

As with most grammens, this one's meter is sometimes a little desperate. To help you read it properly, I have placed in bold and italics the syllables to be emphasized. As an example of how this works, observe how I do it in the first few lines of "The Cremation of Sam McGee":

There are strange things done in the midnight sun
By the men who moil for gold;
The Arctic trails have their secret tales
That would make your blood run cold.
The Northern Lights have seen queer sights,
But the queerest they ever did see
Was that night on the marge of Lake LeBarge
I cremated Sam McGee.

Get it? I hope so. Now here's my grammen. By the way, I hate the traditional tune and style, but for lack of a different agreed-upon format, I've stuck to it.

Thanks for this blog goes to Gaby 'n Fish,
[Na na na na na na na]
Who loves to write posts about poo and/or pish.
[Na na na na na na na]
To all his neuroses will always pander
[Na na na na na na na]
The mariner named Captain Salamander.
[Na na na na na na na]

If drinking on Purim, take good notes
[Na na na na na na na]
Of discourse on spirits by Rabbi Rotes.
[Na na na na na na na]
Eat a lot; have yummy dishes
[Na na na na na na na]
Served, perhaps, by Rotes the Mrs.
[Na na na na na na na]

[Mrs. Rotes is also a lawyer - I know; I'm not trying to stereotype women as being nothing more than man's operative in the kitchen.]

Want some fun? Then you should, maybe,
[Na na na na na na na]
Speak to good ol' Maxiebaby.
[Na na na na na na na]
Having fun for all her life
[Na na na na na na na]
Will be "The Brain" - the great & Wife.
[Na na na na na na na]

Our first father, he was Jon;
[Na na na na na na na]
Now he's learning over yon.
[Na na na na na na na]
Feel an earthquake? Well, then, oh boy-
[Na na na na na na na]
Walking nearby may be DoughBoy.
[Na na na na na na na]

hevnsangel19's one
[Na na na na na na na]
Who makes blogs a lot of fun.
[Na na na na na na na]
Comes and goes in spurts does he,
[Na na na na na na na]
But not as much as Ibn Ali.
[Na na na na na na na]

Tommy would probably gripe and complain
If we wrote a grammen about him,
So we won't.
[Na na na oh okay]

Forced into this rhythm jazzy,
[Na na na na na na na]
Mo-de-ra-te-ly Selassie
[Na na na na na na na]
Daunts the poet, as does cunnin'
[Na na na na na na na]
Yeish Lanu Harbe Baquanim.
[Na na na na na na na]

"I'm not guilty as is claimed,"
[Na na na na na na na]
Says He Who Must Not Be Named,
[Na na na na na na na]
Yet he loves the puns so wry
[Na na na na na na na]
Of the blogger known as Pi.
[Na na na na na na na]

At Y.U., the MikeyGee
[Na na na na na na na]
Is part of my family.
[Na na na na na na na]
Recently joined Mister Gulbat;
[Na na na na na na na]
Take a minute now to mull that.
[Na na na na na na na]

"At your humour coarse and bald
[Na na na na na na na]
I am right Shocked and Appalled."
[Na na na na na na na]
If you do not like it, well,
[Na na na na na na na]
Pack your things and go to [Na na na na na na na]

Have a very merry Purim

'Twas the night before Purim, and all through the house
Not a creature was stirring, not even a half-furry, half-earthen mouse.
We poked fun at Darwin, at Einstein and Gauss,
And pulled from our hair lice not laid by a louse.
...
Merry Purim to all, and to all a good night.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Is everyone alright?"

-RBP, upon entering chaotic classroom

From The Devil's Dictionary

Ghoul, n. A demon addicted to the reprehensible habit of devouring the dead. The existence of ghouls has been disputed by that class of controversialists who are more concerned to deprive the world of comforting beliefs than to give it anything good in their place. In 1640 Father Secchi saw one in a cemetery near Florence and frightened it away with the sign of the cross. He describes it as gifted with many heads and an uncommon allowance of limbs, and he saw it in more than one place at a time. The good man was coming away from dinner at the time and explains that if he had not been "heavy with eating" he would have seized the demon at all hazards. Atholston relates that a ghoul was caught by some sturdy peasants in a churchyard at Sudbury and ducked in a horsepond. (He appears to think that so distinguished a criminal should have been ducked in a tank of rose-water.) The water turned at once to blood "and so contynues unto ys daye." The pond has since been bled with a ditch. As late as the beginning of the fourteenth century a ghoul was cornered in the crypt of the cathedral at Amiens and the whole population surrounded the place. Twenty armed men with a priest at their head, bearing a crucifix, entered and captured the ghoul, which, thinking to escape by the stratagem, had transformed itself to the semblance of a well known citizen, but was nevertheless hanged, drawn and quartered in the midst of hideous popular orgies. The citizen whose shape the demon had assumed was so affected by the sinister occurrence that he never again showed himself in Amiens and his fate remains a mystery.

Ephraim Stulberg on Purim, 5766: Eating Before the Megilla Reading

The sun has set, the stars have come out, and the fast is over. You reach into your pocket and pull out an apple, grateful for the few bites you’ll be able to consume before commencing the marathon Megilla session you’re about to endure, every other verse all but certain to be interrupted by the obnoxious noise-making of over-indulged pre-teens who are but dimly aware of what it means to fast. Yet as your teeth begin to sink into that much-anticipated bright red fruit, you hear a gasp from those seated near you, who look on in slack-jawed horror; meanwhile, the shul know-it-all starts yelling at you, making vague references to the “Shulchan Aruch” and some law he recalls hearing on a Torah tape.

Purim has barely started and you’re in trouble already. Or are you? Well, on the surface it would appear that you’ve just committed a major faux pas. Rema rules (O.C. 692:4) that one is not permitted to eat prior to hearing the Megilla. In this, he follows the T’rumas Ha-ddeshen (Responsa #109), who analogizes between the Q’ri’as Sh’ma, which the gemara (B’rakhos 4b) explicitly rules must precede the evening meal.

Now, the sort of eating that is prohibited prior to the recitation of the evening Sh’ma is only the eating of a meal that would require the recitation of the full Birkas Ha-mmazon (Mordechai, Tur), and so presumably the same condition would hold true for Megilla; and indeed, this is the initial ruling of the Magen Avraham (692:7), who offers that, in any case, the main Megilla reading is done in the daytime (see Tosafos on Megilla 4a). He goes on, however, to add that “nonetheless one ought not to be lenient other than in a case of great need. And in the Tosefta (Shabbos 1:4) it is written that Megilla is akin to Lulav, Shofar and Q’rias Sh’ma [in this regard].” He concludes by noting that according to Maharil, it would appear that eating prior to the Megilla reading is unacceptable unless one’s health is in danger.

One cannot help but be struck by the disjointedness of the argumentation in this passage. The first half of the note appears completely accepting of the idea that one may eat a small amount of food before hearing the Megilla at night. And yet whereas concerning Q’rias Sh’ma and the search for hametz, Magen Avraham is lenient and permits the consumption of snacks (see 235:4 and 431:4), his ultimate ruling regarding Megilla is rather draconian!

After writing thus far, I found that these questions have been asked by R’ Abraham Poyper in his comprehensive work on the laws of prayer, Ishei Yisrael (Ch. 27 n. 75), who adds to the equation the fact that the Mishnah B’rurah is lenient regarding Sh’ma and the search for hametz, but not when it comes to Megilla and the taking of the Lulav (652:7). He cites a couple of obscure works, both of which I don’t have on my shelves, that suggest possible answers, but annoyingly decides not to summarize what they say.

As for the Magen Avraham’s proof from the Tosefta, it is really a rather dubious piece of evidence. It reads: “Just as we interrupt for Q’rias Sh’ma, so do we interrupt for the Megilla reading, Hallel, Shofar, Lulav, and all the other mitzvos that are mentioned in the Torah.” There is no mention made as to what is being interrupted, and as the Tosefta chooses Q’rias Sh’ma – before which the Magen Avraham himself permits snacking - as its prototype, it is difficult to see just what the proof is. Moreover, this Tosefta is really an addendum to the second mishnah in Tractate Shabbos, which says “we interrupt for Q’rias Sh’ma but not for prayer”, which the gemara explains as meaning that one whose sole occupation is Torah study ought not to interrupt his learning in order to daven. Interpreted in this light, the Tosefta is entirely irrelevant to our discussion.

At any rate, there is surely some room for leeway here. And so if one is needed to read the Megilla, and is unable to pronounce the text without drinking a glass of water first, I doubt anyone would object:)

A Festive Purim to All,

Ephraim Stulberg

This is why I don't wear a black hat...

...it's just too complicated.

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Bat boy, n. Batman's summer job when he was a kid.

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Self-explanatory, adj.

Ephraim Stulberg on Parshat Zachor, 5764

There is an interesting aspect pertaining to Amalek which I've never seen mentioned by anyone (See Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Biah 13:17). The Mechilta towards the very end of P' Be'shalach cites an opinion of R' Eliezer, who states that the halacha is that while all the nations are permitted to convert to Judaism, Amalek cannot. This seems to be not only a simple commandment, that it is preferable not to accept them, since there is a commandment to eradicate them, but rather it seems as though even post facto, such a conversion is no good. We find that when the descendant of an Amalekite convert informs David of his role in the death of Saul, he is put to death, seemingly at least in part because of his lineage: at least, this seems to be what is suggested by the Mechilta. Has anyone heard something regarding this law?

Ephraim Stulberg on Parshat Zachor, 5766

I hope to have something on T'tsave on Sunday, as well as a Purim essay. In the meantime, here's a thought on Zakhor.

R. Moshe Shternbuch, in his Mo’adim U-z’manim (vol. 2, #165) discusses whether or not one must understand each word of P’ Zakhor in order to fulfill one’s obligation, in light of the opinion of the Tosafists (B’rakhos 45b) and others that the mechanism of shome’a k’oneh can only be utilized when the audience understands the text being recited. During the course of his analysis, he raises the fact that there are some verses of whose meaning “even b’nei torah, unless they are careful to study Scripture with the commentaries, and surely simpletons and women” are unaware. By way of illustration, he cites the phrase “and he/you did not fear God”, which is contained at the end of the second verse of P’ Zakhor. Does it refer to the Israelites, who are after all the subject immediately antecedent to the pronoun “he/you”, and thus describe the reason for the Jews’ susceptibility to attack; or rather to the Amalekites, in which case it serves to underscore the brazenness of the assault? R’ Shternbuch cites the opinion of Rashi, who favours the latter alternative, as being authoritative, and is fairly dismissive of other explanations.

Interestingly enough, this very verse is given extensive treatment by Prof Simcha Kogut, in his work, Correlations between Biblical Accentuation and traditional Jewish Exegesis (Heb.), an excellent volume I happened to pick up in Monsey last week. Kogut examines the relationship between the cantillary notes (ta’amei ha-miqra) and traditional rabbinic and medieval biblical exegesis, and in this instance, he finds the placement of the esnahta immediately prior to the phrase “and he did not fear God”, as indicating a separation between the clause of the sentence dealing with the Israelites (“and you were thirsty and tired”) and the concluding words “and he/you did not fear God”. Thus although there are compelling textual reasons to suggest that the verse refers to the Israelites – and indeed, many of the midrashim (e.g. Sifrei, Mekhilta) do adopt such an approach – the authors of the notes adopted an approach to the verse which served to mitigate the culpability of the Israelites in the incident. Thus it was not, as the Mekhilta would have it, because the Jews lacked disciple in their Torah study that they were assailed, but rather because of the pathological antisemitism of the Amalekites.

Aside from R. Shternbuch’s more pedantic halakhic point, there is another sense in which these two different exegetical approaches are important. For what is at stake in this verse is nothing less than the origins of anti-Semitism, asking as it does the question “Why do they hate us?” Can we dismiss the Amalekites as fundamentally “evil”, as lacking a basic fear in God? What role do we, as Jews, play in the propagation of anti-Jewish attitudes? What, in short, do we mean to accomplish with this mitzvah of Zakhor?

Frumteens.com: Final Update

My most recent question to frumteens.com has not been posted (unless I missed it somewhere). However, I lost my interest in the site after reading (as I wish I had done to begin with) that not all questions posed to it will be posted (or answered). That basically means that it's a forum for the people who run it to express their opinions while controlling, as little or as much as they would like, the quantity and quality of dissent and challenge that they acknowledge. There's nothing wrong with such a site; were I interested in the opinions of the moderator/s, I would read it. It was actually, however, the potential for a free debate that prompted me to write questions to it, and I now realise that that potential was rather smaller than I had originally thought. I therefore won't bother with it any more.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Idiot."

- JS Sr., to HK, re. HK's having forgotten to have his Shadow Day permission sheet signed

From The Devil's Dictionary

Ghost, n. The outward and visible sign of an inward fear.

He saw a ghost.

It occupied - that dismal thing! -

The path that he was following.

Before he'd time to stop and fly,

An earthquake trifled with the eye

That saw a ghost.

He fell as fall the early good;

Unmoved that awful vision stood.

The stars that danced before his ken

He wildly brushed away, and then

He saw a post.

Jared Macphester.

Accounting for the uncommon behavior of ghosts, Heine mentions somebody's ingenious theory to the effect that they are as much afraid of us as we of them. Not quite, if I may judge from such tables of comparative speed as I am able to compile from memories of my own experience.

There is one insuperable obstacle to a belief in ghosts. A ghost never comes naked: he appears either in a winding-sheet or "in his habit as he lived." To believe in him, then, is to believe that not only have the dead the power to make themselves visible after there is nothing left of them, but that the same power inheres in textile fabrics. Supposing the products of the loom to have this ability, what object would they have in exercising it? And why does not the apparition of a suit of clothes sometimes walk abroad without a ghost in it? These be riddles of significance. They reach away down and get a convulsive grasp on the very taproot of this flourishing faith.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"I need marks, not a hug."

- UH, desperate, responding to offer

From The Devil's Dictionary

Geology, n. The science of the earth's crust - to which, doubtless, will be added that of its interior whenever a man shall come up garrulous out of a well. The geological formations of the globe already noted are catalogued thus: The Primary, or lower one, consists of rocks, bones of mired mules, gas-pipes, miners' tools, antique statues minus the nose, Spanish doubloons and ancestors. The Secondary is largely made up of red worms and moles. The Tertiary comprises railway tracks, patent pavements, grass, snakes, mouldy boots, beer bottles, tomato cans, intoxicated citizens, garbage, anarchists, snap-dogs and fools.

Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge

Click here to see the post "Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge".

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"OTI of the Latter-Day Saints"

- MF the Elder, brainstorming alternate names for OTI

From The Devil's Dictionary

Genealogy, n. An account of one's descent from an ancestor who did not particularly care to trace his own.

The Orthodoxy Test #17: If the Rambam Was Alive

If the Rambam was alive he'd be

a) Right Wing Yeshivish
b) Left Wing Yeshivish
c) Right Wing Modern Orthodox
d) Left Wing Modern Orthodox
e) considered an apikores
f) Leave this question out of my results

First of all, if the Rambam were alive today he'd be rolling in his grave.

The only one of these options that cannot be disputed is (e). Somebody would consider him an apikores. However, I doubt that everybody would, and so it still remains to fit him into one of categories (a)-(d). I chose (b), because I think he was very "shtark", but had a brain. (C) is almost equally tempting, but I just can't picture him wearing a plaid shirt and a small leather kippah with clips. I flatter myself to think he'd actually be a "Huh?".

I assume that in composing this question, lamedzayin had in mind the fact that the Rambam believed that Chazal had imperfect knowledge of science (as has been mentioned on this and other blogs in the past) - a position that many "yeshivish" rabbis and laymen now understand to be apikorsus. Maybe if the Rambam were alive today he'd feel differently, or maybe he'd just be one of the many rabbis - both "yeshivish" and "modern orthodox" (by the way, which type is Rabbi Hershel Schachter?) - who continue to think that the position is neither heretical nor wrong. Lamedzayin probably also was thinking more generally of the Rambam's knowledge of the gentile philosophy of his day. I imagine the Rambam would probably be reasonably well-versed in a lot of today's secular thought, though he might not recommend that everybody else pursue his level of proficiency. I don't think that such an attitude would preclude his being "left-wing yeshivish".

Basically, it comes down to this: I think the Rambam would wear a white shirt, a dark suit and a black hat, doing which, as far as I can tell, almost always guarantees that you will be "yeshivish" (unless you're Amish).

Ephraim Stulberg on Tetzaveh, 5765

There are three separate places in P’ T’tzaveh in which the Torah seems to teach that if a Kohein serves in the Temple without the proper clothing on, he is punishable by a Divinely administered death:

1) The first mention is in the sentences describing the bluish/green cloak (“me’il”): “And it shall be on Aharon while he serves, and its sound shall be heard when he enters the Holy Place in front of God, and when he leaves, and he shall not die” (28:35).

2) The Torah then proceeds to list a few more of the Kohein Gadol’s vestments (“tzitz”, “mitznefes”, “kesones”, “avneit”), and then, after mentioning the pants (“michn’sayim”), it says: “And they shall be upon Aharon and upon his sons when the enter the Tent of Gathering, or when they approach the Altar to serve in the Holy Place, and they shall not bear any sin and die” (28:43). In both these first two instances, Rashi notes that the prevented death referred to in the Torah would have been meted out to them because they had worn fewer than the number of clothes required for service.

3) The third verse, which is the one used by the Gemara to deduce the penalty of Divine death for the “m’chusar b’gadim”, is to be found after God instructs Moshe to dress Aharon and his sons in their new clothes. God tells Moshe that these clothes - only seven of the eight for the Kohein Gadol, and three of the four for the regular Kohanim, are mentioned: the pants are not listed – are to be “a kehuna for them” (29:9). The Gemara (Sanhedrin 83b) explains that the verse means to say that the Kohanim are only to be considered as such when they have their special clothing on. Otherwise, when they perform the Divine service, it is as though a regular Jew did it. And we know from elsewhere that a non-Kohein who serves in the Temple is punishable by Divinely administered death. There is also a fourth source (see Z’vachim 17b), but that’s enough for now.

Why did the Torah give us three sources for the same law? If we eliminate the first source, then the question is not so difficult. Tosafos (Z’vachim 17b) and Ramban explain that the second reference is written regarding the pants, which are not included in the third source. Thus we have one source for the pants, and one for everything else. Alternatively, they suggest that the second source refers not only to the pants, but in fact to all of the clothing: i.e. when it says “and they shall be upon Aharon”, it refers to all the clothes listed in the parasha, not merely the last one mentioned. The comparison of a Kohein who serves improperly attired to a non-Kohein, write Tosafos, teaches us that not only does the fellow get the death penalty, but his service is disqualified, and his sacrifice is no good. The Ran (Sanhedrin 83b) suggests that if we only had the second source, we might have thought that the Kohein was liable even if merely entered the Temple underdressed; the comparison with a non-Kohein tells us that it is only a problem once the Kohein actually performs a service in his casual dress.

Most commentaries seem to feel that the punishment of death referred to by the cloak (source #1) is not a warning not to serve without the proper clothes; instead, they say that the Torah is simply explaining why the Kohein must have bells on the hem of his cloak. But Rashi says that the death sentence is meant literally, as a warning, and so we must wonder what he does with all of these three verses.

Many of Rashi’s interpreters defend his position. The Taz, in his work “Divrei David”, explains that the warning regarding the wearing of the pants, in particular, was something that one might have interpreted in two different ways. If the Torah had only threatened death for one who enters the Temple pantless, one might not have extrapolated that this would be the case for other clothes. Pants, after all, cover one’s nakedness, and perhaps only they were seen by the Torah as a sine qua non. Therefore the Torah also had to make this warning regarding the cloak.

Conversely, if the Torah had simply warned the Kohanim not to serve without their cloak, we would not have deduced that this prohibition applies to the pants as well. The pants were worn underneath the cloak, and were, in a sense, unnecessary. Therefore the Torah required two verses to warn Aharon and his sons against going to work without the proper clothing. Verses 1 and 2 are both necessary, while the need for verse 3 will be explained in the same manner as we explained its necessity according to those who argue with Rashi (i.e. the second answer of Tosafos).

There are other explanations as well, but, being short on time, I’ll leave things as are. Check out the comments of the L’vush Orah, which are the most convincing I’ve seen so far.

Let's All Give a Big, Warm Welcome to Gulbat!

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Now, I have made a handout for you, Queen of the Handouts that I am."

- JC

From The Devil's Dictionary

Generous, adj. Originally this word meant noble by birth and was rightly applied to a great multitude of persons. It now means noble by nature and is taking a bit of a rest.

Question

Have RK, HK, AK and DK ever reflected on the brilliant punnery of the author of Birkas Hamazon while reciting the words "Harachaman hu yevareich es avi Murray, ba'al habayis hazeh?"

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Tommy said, 'Don't do it; it was so stupid; too dumb. It was just boring.'"

- KA, speculating on TF's response to an idea

From The Devil's Dictionary

Future, n. That period of time in which our affairs prosper, our friends are true and our happiness is assured.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"X indeed."

- DR

From The Devil's Dictionary

Frog, n. A reptile with edible legs. The first mention of frogs in profane literature is in Homer's narrative of the war between them and the mice. Skeptical persons have doubted Homer's authorship of the work, but the learned, ingenious and industrious Dr. Schliemann has set the question forever at rest by uncovering the bones of the slain frogs. One of the forms of moral suasion by which Pharaoh was besought to favor the Israelites was a plague of frogs, but Pharaoh, who liked them fricasées, remarked, with truly oriental stoicism, that he could stand it as long as the frogs and the Jews could; so the programme was changed. The frog is a diligent songster, having a good voice but no ear. The libretto of his favorite opera, as written by Aristophanes, is brief, simple and effective - "brekekex-koäx"; the music is apparently by that eminent composer, Richard Wagner. Horses have a frog in each hoof - a thoughtful provision of nature, enabling them to shine in a hurdle race.

Condolences

To Mr. Scarowsky on the death of his mother.

He Who Must Not Be Named on Tetzaveh

Hey, if Ephraim can write this stuff, why can't I? (Because he knows what he's talking about and I don't, you say? Well, harrumph.)

A popular question about parshat Tetzaveh is why Moses's name does not appear anywhere in the parsha, a phenomenon unique among all parshiyot of the Torah except those of the book of Genesis, where you wouldn't expect to find Moses's name, since he was only born in parshat Shemot. I've always wondered how legitimate this question is, considering that God did not divide the Torah into our parshiyot: those divisions are rabbinic in origin, and of a later vintage, and so the absence of Moses's name in Tetzaveh could be a purely coincidental by-product of the fact that the rabbis who made our divisions judged Tetzaveh to be the right size for an independent portion. Indeed, there have been a variety of different ways of dividing the Torah into different weekly portions: in some places, in some periods of history, for example, the Torah was divided up in such a way that it took three years to complete. Obviously, the parshiyot in this system were on average only about one-third the size of ours, and I would not be at all surprised if there were several such post-Bereishit parshiyot in which Moses's name did not appear. If we followed that system today, I doubt this question - about Moses's absence - would be asked at all.

However, many scholars have evidently accepted the question as valid, presumably on the assumption that either (a) the rabbis who came up with our division intentionally divided things up so that Moses's name would not appear in Tetzaveh; or (b) God intentionally wrote the Torah in such a way that when the rabbis created our division, they would find natural a division in which one parsha would contain no mention of Moses's name; or (c) God manipulated the minds of the rabbis who created our division so that they would create a "Moses"-less Tetzaveh.

The standard answer given to the question of why Moses's name does not appear in Tetzaveh is that of the Ba'al Haturim (Exodus 27:20, s.v. "Ve'atah tetzaveh"): the Gemara says that a wise man's curse is fulfilled even if the curse was conditional and the condition was not satisfied (Makkot 11a). Moses, when pleading that the Jews be forgiven after the sin of the golden calf, said to God, "If [you do] not [forgive them], then erase me from your book that you have written" (Exodus 32:32). Moses was thereby conditionally cursing himself to be erased from the Torah, and even though the condition was not satisfied - God did forgive the Jews - the curse was still fulfilled, at least to the extent that Moses's name was wiped out of one parsha - Tetzaveh.

My questions on this explanation are the following: (1) The Gemara doesn't say that a wise man's conditional curse is sort of fulfilled even if the condition is not satisfied. How is the erasure of Moses's name from parshat Tetzaveh a fulfillment of his curse? That's not what he said! (2) Why Tetzaveh, as opposed to any other parsha or set of parshiyot? (The Ba'al Haturim does offer an explanation as to why specifically Tetzaveh does not contain Moses's name, but I'll bet you could make equally compelling arguments for several other parshiyot.)

I have a suggestion about Moses's self-curse which does not explain why his name is absent from Tetzaveh (as discussed, I'm not sure that's a problem), but does, I think, better reflect the words of the Gemara at Makkot 11a.

Moses, as you all know, was named "Moshe" by the daughter of Pharaoh, who found him floating in a little boat on the Nile (Exodus 2:5-10). His mother, Yocheved, had presumably named him something else: he was three months old by the time she set him afloat (Exodus 2:2) - well old enough to have been named. What was Moses's real name - the one given to him by his Israelite mother?

Furthermore, I question whether Pharaoh's daughter really gave Moses the name "Moshe". From Exodus 2:10 it seems pretty clear that "Moshe" is a name derived from a Hebrew verb. What are the odds that Pharaoh's daughter spoke Hebrew? I propose that Moses was given a name that might have sounded nothing like "Moshe", but meant in Egyptian approximately what "Moshe" means in Hebrew, and that the Torah simply translates all of the words of Pharaoh's daughter, including the name she gave Moses and her explanation of its meaning, from the original Egyptian into Hebrew. What did his real Egyptian name sound like? No idea.

I imagine you can see where I'm going with this. The real, Hebrew name that Moses presumably had - the one given to him by Yocheved (or possibly Amram) - is never mentioned in the Torah. Neither, perhaps, is the one the daughter of Pharaoh gave him. What is the only "name" we have for Moses in the Torah? "Moshe" - something he may never in his life have been called; not his name. It may thus really be that Moses's name was completely erased from the Torah, as per his self-curse.