Another Science/Chazal Update

More on Ramban.

Update to Science of Chazal

New source: Ritva. See here or here.

Quote

I found the following statement in the comments on this post of http://hirhurim.blogspot.com. I couldn't resist importing it. If you don't know him, you won't fully appreciate it.

My rebbe Rav Blachman once had an entire wall of sefarim fall down just as he walked *out* of his office. He said he took it as a message to speak more nicely about acharonim when he argued on them.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Insurrection, n. An unsuccessful revolution. Disaffection's failure to substitute misrule for bad government.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"The dress was shaatnez, and the woman wore it more than two hundred times."
"And her husband wore it four times, but that's a different story."

- DR, imitating deep-voiced shaatnez video narrator; RBC

From The Devil's Dictionary

Insurance, n. An ingenious modern game of chance in which the player is permitted to enjoy the comfortable conviction that he is beating the man who keeps the table.

Insurance Agent: My dear sir, that is a fine house - pray let me insure it.
House Owner: With pleasure. Please make the annual premium so low that by the time when, according to the tables of your actuary, it will probably be destroyed by fire I will have paid you considerably less than the face of the policy.
Insurance Agent: O dear, no - we could not afford to do that. We must fix the premium so that you will have paid more.
House Owner: How, then, can I afford that?
Insurance Agent: Why, your house may burn down at any time. There was Smith's house, for example, which -
House Owner: Spare me - there were Brown's house, on the contrary, and Jones's house, and Robinson's house, which -
Insurance Agent: Spare me!
House Owner: Let us understand each other. You want me to pay you money on the supposition that something will occur previously to the time set by yourself for its occurrence. In other words, you expect me to bet that my house will not last so long as you say that it will probably last.
Insurance Agent: But if your house burns without insurance it will be a total loss.
House Owner: Beg your pardon - by your own actuary's tables I shall probably have saved, when it burns, all the premiums I would otherwise have paid to you - amounting to more than the face of the policy they would have bought. But suppose it to burn, uninsured, before the time upon which your figures are based. If I could not afford that, how could you if it were insured?
Insurance Agent: O, we should make ourselves whole from our luckier ventures with other clients. Virtually, they pay your loss.
House Owner: And virtually, then, don't I help to pay their losses? Are not their houses as likely as mine to burn before they have paid you as much as you must pay them? The case stands this way: you expect to take more money from your clients than you pay to them, do you not?
Insurance Agent: Certainly: if we did not -
House Owner: I would not trust you with my money. Very well, then. If it is certain, with reference to the whole body of your clients, that they lose money on you it is probable, with reference to any one of them, that he will. It is these individual probabilities that make the aggregate certainty.
Insurance Agent: I will not deny it - but look at the figures in this pamph -
House Owner: Heaven forbid!
Insurance Agent: You spoke of saving the premiums which you would otherwise pay to me. Will you not be more likely to squander them? We offer you an incentive to thrift.
House Owner: The willingness of A to take care of B's money is not peculiar to insurance, but as a charitable institution you command esteem. Deign to accept its expression from a Deserving Object.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Sir, keep your voice below my hearing threshold, please."

- KA (either you get it or you don't)

Science of Chazal Update

New update to Sources Indicating That Chazal Did Not Possess Perfect Scientific Knowledge: Rashi.

(I updated the post on Gaby's Gobbledygook too, but it was easier to link to TOWOHWMNBN.)

Ephraim Stulberg on Tazria, 5766: Yotsei Dofen

The mishnah (Niddah 5:1) discusses the status of a “yotsei dofen”, a baby born via non-vaginal birth. It rules that such a birth does not automatically render its mother ritually impure; this is in contrast with a regular, vaginal delivery, which, regardless of whether or not it is accompanied by bleeding, causes the mother to become impure for either seven or fourteen days. The source for this law, explains the gemara (Niddah 40a), is the verse at the beginning of this week’s reading. The introductory phrase “Isha ki sazria” is of course redundant – not to mention somewhat biologically difficult to explain (see Ramban) – and is taken by the gemara to refer to the process of parturition. The woman becomes impure only when the baby exits from the same passage through which the mother conceived from the father’s seed.

The usual definition of “yotsei dofen” is a Caesarian section. I recently found a suggestion in Tosafos (Kareisos 7b) which is very strange. Take a look for yourself.

Ephraim Stulberg on Metzora, 5765

The gemara (Sotah 16a) tells us that there are three places in which a Mosaic tradition (“Halacha l’Moshe mi-Sinai”) uproots the literal meaning of a verse. The Torah seems to say one thing, but tradition tells us, without making a real attempt to reinterpret the text, that the law is otherwise.

The gemara wonders why more than three cases aren’t listed. The Torah tells us that on the seventh day of the m’tzora’s purification process, he must shave “all his body: his head, his beard, and his eyebrows, all his hair he must shave” (Vayikra 14:9). This is a classic case of “klal u-frat u-chlal”, and the midrashic meaning of the verse would seem to be that anything which shares the essential properties of the specified body parts must be shaved, whereas one’s armpits, which are different in that their hair is usually concealed, are exempt from the commandment. The Mosaic tradition, however, tells us that in fact the m’tzora must shave his entire body, until he is “smooth as a gourd.”

So why isn’t this instance included in the gemara’s list of incidences of Mosaic traditions “uprooting” the meaning of verses? The gemara answers that a “klal u-frat u-chlal” is not called “mikra”, the literal meaning of the verse; it is only “mid’rabanan”, of rabbinic status.

Now, the issue of what to call these sorts of d’rashos derived by way of the Thirteen Hermeneutic Principles is an old one. It was a bone of contention between Rambam and Ramban (see the Introduction to Sefer Ha-mitzvos #2), and the former’s contention that they are considered as essentially rabbinic seems to be borne out by our gemara.

MaHaRaT”Z Chayos suggests, in defence of the Ramban, that the gemara in fact contains an error, and that instead of saying “mid’rabanan”, it ought to say “midrash”. He bases this emendation on the Yerushalmi, and indeed this does appear to have been the version that the Me’iri had as well. It is not a proof.

Quoting Pi:

> What are the three? Is "ayin tachat ayin etc." one of them?

No, although I thought of that as I was writing. The three are: 1) That kisuy ha-dam can be done with anything out of which one can grow plants, not just dust 2) A nazir is prohibited from shaving with anything, not just a razor; 3) the Torah says one must write a divorce document as a "sefer", but the halacha tells us that anything that is not attached to the ground is okay.

It just occurred to me that from this list, we can begin to understand the answer to your question. It includes only things in which the Torah seems to be specific, though the Halacha tells us that things are really much broader. In fact, to narrow it down even more, the dominant theme seems to be that the Halacha actually makes things more broadly permissible and lenient.

Thus Rashi challenges the inclusion of the nazir's razor, which is actually a chumra, and he suggests the variant version of this list, found in the Yerushalmi (Kiddushin), which replaces the razor with the halacha that the owner of a Hebrew slave can hammer anything through the slave's ear, not just a "martze'a". At any rate, you can see that "ayin tachas ayin" doesn't quite fit here, even if we do accept the premise that the literal meaning of the verse is as Draconian as commonly understood.

Ephraim Stulberg on Tazria, 5765

The Torah states in P’ Tazria that the days of automatic impurity for a woman who has just given birth to a male are to be “as the days of separation caused by her menstrual flow” (Vayikra 12:2), i.e. seven days. The strange part of this statement is that by this point the Torah has yet to teach us anything at all regarding the concept of niddah itself; why then does it introduce this new law by linking it to another law of which we have yet to hear?

In his commentary on the verse in question, the Netziv invokes a statement of Ramban to the effect that the prohibitions of niddah had existed even in pre-Mosaic times. Thus in P’ Tazria, Ramban writes: “A woman is called “niddah” during her menstrual period because people ostracize her (“nidduy”) and remove her from human society; men and women distance her[from themselves] and she sits alone, not speaking to anyone, for her speech is impure to them; and the earth upon which she treads is impure to them as a decomposing body.”

In P’ Vayeitzei (B’reishis 31:35), Ramban discusses Rachel’s claim that she was unable to get up to let her father search for his idols, because “the way of women is upon me.” Why couldn’t she get up, he wonders. Surely her cramps weren’t all that bad. (Yes, Ramban was a man.) He explains that in ancient times, it was customary to steer far away from menstruating women, for reasons similar to those cited above. He even cites a baraisa (of spurious provenance) which cites halachos to the effect that one may not talk to a niddah nor stand upon the same ground that she has covered. In P’ Acharei Mos (Vayikra 18:19), Ramban adds that if a woman looks in the mirror for long enough during her period, she’ll begin to see red specks appear on its surface, “because the bad and damaging nature that is within her will produce bad air, which will stick to the mirror.” In general, he writes, the prohibitions which we have against interaction with niddos are all health based.

Ramban’s explanation is more or less repeated in Sefer Ha-chinuch (#166 and #182), which is, after all, written by a student of his. While Rambam (Moreh Ha-n’vuchim 3:47) also seems to take such a view, he does issue a caveat that we ought not to follow the more extreme practices advocated in the more obscure literatures of the Magi, and he specifically mentions the practice of isolating the niddah and burning the places upon which she has walked as being counter to the halachic tradition and pointless. Nonethess, writes R’ Qafih in his notes, there are some Jewish communities in the lands of the Magi who adhere to such practices. (For another strange practice, see Ra’avad at the end of Maseches Tamid, where he cites the “Sefer Ha-miktzo’os” that says that a Kohen may not enter a house with a menstruating women in it, and it he does he may not recite Bircas Kohanim.)

There are other references in rabbinic literature that suggest that this aversion to menstruating women was not primarily a halachic attitude. Avraham threw out the food prepared by Sarah when he found out she had become a niddah (see Bava M’tziya 87a). Yehuda was concerned, in his encounter with Tamar, that she not be a niddah (Sotah 10a). We find even gentiles maintaining such aversions (see Ta’anis 22a). But at any rate, getting back to original question, we do see from all this that the Torah is perfectly justified in assuming that readers would know all about “the days of separation caused by her menstrual flow,” and its usage of this reference point begins to make more sense in light of discussion.

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Opposition, n. A wonderful lens which permits the politician to perceive every matter of governance as clear-cut and straightforward.

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Euthenasia, n. Chinese children.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Innate, adj. Natural, inherent - as innate ideas, that is to say, ideas that we are born with, having had them previously imparted to us. The doctrine of innate ideas is one of the most admirable faiths of philosophy, being itself an innate idea and therefore inaccessible to disproof, though Locke foolishly supposed himself to have given it "a black eye." Among innate ideas may be mentioned the belief in one's ability to conduct a newspaper, in the greatness of one's country, in the superiority of one's civilization, in the importance of one's personal affairs and in the interesting nature of one's diseases.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Moving along..."

- EM

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Imprimatur. The child's confession.

Yeshivish Mind Experiment

Consider the following list of people:

1. Moshe Rabbeinu
2. David Hamelech
3. Eliyahu Hanavi
4. Ezra Hasofer
5. Shammai Hazaken
6. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai
7. Rabbi Akiva
8. Rabbi Yochanan
9. Abayei
10. Rav Saadia Gaon
11. Rashi
12. Rabbeinu Tam
13. Rambam
14. Ramban
15. Rav Yosef Karo
16. The Maharal
17. The Arizal
18. The Gra
19. The Chofetz Chaim
20. Rav Kook
21. The Chazon Ish
22. Rav Moshe Feinstein
23. Rav Aharon Kotler
24. Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
25. The Satmar Rebbe
26. Rav Shach

Now perform the following mind experiment. Suppose, in conversation with your average, say, 19-year-old "yeshivish" yeshiva student, I argue that one of these people committed a particular grave error. Assume the student has never heard anybody make this allegation before, although I do have considerable historical evidence to back myself up. Concerning which people do you think I would encounter the most resistance in making my claim? List these personalities in order of least to most resistance. If there are too many people for you, you can leave some out, or make several different lists with different combinations of people.

Intelligent Design

I just posted the following comment to http://hirhurim.blogspot.com. Since it doesn't really require context in order to be understood, I figure I may as well post it here too. It could have been better written, but I wanted to get it up quickly.

Intelligent design is a big deal among Christians in the United States because many religious Christians want it taught in the state-funded, nominally secular public school system, in order that Christian children not be atheistically brainwashed (as they see it). By contrast, orthodox Jews, almost without exception, send their children to schools where they get lots of religious instruction. There is relatively little risk that they will graduate high school believing, as a result of their educational curricula, that Judaism is a bunch of hooey. Since the practical implications of the debate are relatively small, the discussion is not nearly as important within orthodox circles as it is among the American populace as a whole.

I do not mean to imply that the origins of life should not be important to orthodox Jews. It's just that in such circles, the impact of such a discussion is, relatively speaking, more in the realm of philosophy, theology and intellectualism than it is a pressing practical matter.

The Orthodoxy Test #25: Midrashim as Pshat

Midrashim should be taken to be pshat

a) always
b) almost always
c) when it's reasonable to do so
d) occasionally, but not usually
e) almost never
f) Leave this question out of my results

(C) all the way. I don't think any justification is required.

תם ונשלם שבח לא-ל בורא עולם

From The Devil's Dictionary

Injustice, n. A burden which of all those that we load upon others and carry ourselves is lightest in the hands and heaviest upon the back.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"People should be obscene and not heard; that's what I think."

- SG

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Deist, n. One who wishes to believe in God without having to deal with the consequences.

Baseball Cards

"All I know is it used to take forty-three Marv Throneberry cards to get one Carl Furillo."

- Marv Throneberry

Ephraim Stulberg on Metzora, 5764

Since we are currently in the middle of the period known as S’firas ha-omer, I thought it would be appropriate to mention in this email to mention something involving counting. The Torah explains, towards the end of P’ M’tzora that a woman who is a zava, i.e. who experiences a uterine blood flow outside of her eleven-day niddah “window,” must wait until the flow stops, upon which she must count seven clean days: “ve-safra lah shiv’as yamim”. Following this, she immerses herself in a mikveh, brings a sacrifice, and all is well.

Tosafos (Kesubos 72a) ask why women don’t make a blessing over this counting, as we all do before counting the days following the bringing of the omer offering. After all, the same verb is used in both commands, that of “s’fira.” They answer that since women cannot be certain that they will complete the count, since even a single speck of blood might invalidate the entire period up until then, therefore “they don’t count.” While other sources indicate that the point being made here regards simply the issue of the blessing, one can’t help but feel that there is something significant in these final words of Tosafos, especially in light of the fact that the custom seems to be not to require any such counting at all.

The Noda Bi-y’huda (explains the words of Tosafos. He writes that what they meant is that whereas with Yovel or the Omer, where there is no impediment to the eventual realization of the end point of the period, the words of the Torah asking us to count the days are redundant unless we explain them as referring to an actual commandment of counting the days, by a zava the requirement of counting seven days is obviously more of an activist one, ensuring that she has not emitted any more blood. Therefore one can take the words of the Torah at face value, and not take them to imply some strange commandment of verbally counting the days, as we do with the Omer or Yovel periods.

To add my own two cents, I would suggest an alternative explanation. There is a famous question posed by the Ba’al Ha-ma’or at the very end of P’sachim, in which he asks why we don’t maintain two Omer counts for each day - i.e. on the fourth night of Pesach, say “today is the third day of the omer” and today is the second day of the Omer” - due to the “s’feika d’yoma”, the historic doubt which once existed regarding the establishment of the date of the new month, which is the reason we still observe two days of Yom Tov. While the Ma’or gives his own answer, this question is also answered by the D’var Avraham (vol. I, #34), who writes that the whole notion of s’fira is inimical to any sort of doubt. Thus it is impossible to make two separate counts on a single night, and therefore even when a real “s’feika d’yoma” existed, people simply wouldn’t count the omer at all. So too, a woman who has a doubt as to whether or not this day is indeed part of her eventual set of seven days is not only unable to recite a blessing, but also is unable to perform any sort of s’fira at all. Thus it must be that the Torah is not really commanding us to count, as we do with the Omer, but rather simply to keep track of those days, i.e. to check and make sure she is still clean from any blood. Not very convincing, but then again, you get what you pay for.

The Orthodoxy Test #24: Left-Wing Orthodox Groups

Left wing Orthodox groups like Edah are

a) not really frum
b) frum, but have a totally warped idea of Judaism
c) interesting, but not my cup of tea
d) often thought provoking but occasionally go too far
e) the future of Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

I know next to nothing about Edah.

While I would not want the left-wing orthodox groups I am somewhat more familiar with to be running the show in all of orthodoxy, I think it is useful to have them on the fringe, just as I think that groups on the far right are worth having around, as long as they're not too powerful. I think that moderation is usually the way to go, but sometimes we need extremists to show us we're making a big mistake or not seeing things clearly, or to take risks and/or drastic action when the mainstream is unwilling to do so. Therefore, (d), but with the caveats that my answer does not apply specifically Edah, and that the word "occasionally" may understate the case, depending on the organization.

The Fresh Prince of Yerushalayim

Here is a news story I found online this afternoon.


JERUSALEM (KP International) Will Smith inadvertently caused an uproar when he visited Jerusalem's Western Wall, after screaming girls began pushing against the gender division barrier to get a good look at the 'Hitch' star.
The frenzying fans were so rambunctious that their wails interrupted a boy in the middle of reading the Torah during his bar mitzvah.
"At first, I didn't know who it was," said the boy, Atir Cohen.
Apparently Smith tried to make up for the distraction by shaking Cohen's hand and posing for a picture with him. What a mench.
"He is a very nice man, he was very excited and showed his emotion," Cohen said.
Once things simmered down Smith returned his focus to the wall (also known as the Wailing Wall) where, following ancient tradition, he placed a note (traditionally a prayer) in the cracks of the wall.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Infralapsarian, n. One who ventures to believe that Adam need not have sinned unless he had a mind to - in opposition to the Supralapsarians, who hold that that luckless person's fall was decreed from the beginning. Infralapsarians are sometimes called Sublapsarians without material effect upon the importance and lucidity of their views about Adam.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"JOB WADUJ CVDQF FOB ZHDJFKFQFKDA, NCGHKBE?"

- WZ, HB. NJ'J RDFOBH'J PDRZECKAFJ CVDQF NJ VBKAN "VBMDAI [SQJF] ADF NDKAN FD JPODDE"

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Iambic Pentameter, n.

Pentameter iambic, O! Thou art
The finest form the poet e'er did write;
Didst serve Shakespeare and Chaucer, then depart
With Thomas, gentle into that good night.

For who can name a poem—long
Or short, with metre weak or strong,
With couplets or a-b-a-b,
But in the last half-century
Composed, and lovèd well by those
Who fly from the incessant prose
To refuge in the ebbs and flows
Of poetry—again, who knows
Of such a poem, in whose rows
The rhythm in five iambs goes?

New Comments!

There have been new comments made to the Stupid or Just Plain Dumb? post (the one with the big Lubavitch debate). Unfortunately, I cannot repost it so that it appears on our main page, but I can alert you that the discussion is still ongoing.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Inferiæ, n. (Latin.) Among the Greeks and Romans, sacrifices for propitiation of the Dii Manes, or souls of dead heroes; for the pious ancients could not invent enough gods to satisfy their spiritual needs, and had to have a number of makeshift deities, or, as a sailor might say, jury-gods, which they made out of the most uncompromising materials. It was while sacrificing a bullock to the spirit of Agamemnon that Laiaides, a priest of Aulis, was favored with an audience of that illustrious warrior's shade, who prophetically recounted to him the birth of Christ and the triumph of Christianity, giving him also a rapid but tolerably complete review of events down to the reign of Saint Louis. The narrative ended abruptly at that point, owing to the inconsiderate crowing of a cock, which compelled the ghosted King of Men to scamper back to Hades. There is a fine mediæval flavor to this story, and as it has not been traced back further than Père Brateille, a pious but obscure writer at the court of Saint Louis, we shall probably not err on the side of presumption in considering it apocryphal, though Monsignor Capel's judgment of the matter might be different; and to that I bow—wow.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Once the test starts, I will only understand Croatian."

- RBP

From The Devil's Dictionary

Infancy, n. The period of our lives when, according to Wordsworth, "Heaven lies about us." The world begins lying about us pretty soon afterward.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"You see, David, you've got to use your humour in a good, productive...."

-AS, after DS pun

The Orthodoxy Test #21: Bible Critics

Bible critics

a) are all atheist kofrim reshaim
b) aren't even worth listening to
c) don't understand the text well enough and ask dumb questions
d) ask some good questions, but we have good answers
e) ask really hard questions which we need to find answers to
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I'm not especially knowledgeable about Biblical critics and criticism, but my limited exposure leads me to believe that (a) is false, and that (b) and (c) are certainly not true of all critics. The difference between the two remaining options seems to me to be whether the foundations of Judaism and Jewish belief are threatened by Biblical criticism. I haven't come across any such threats, so to the best of my knowledge (d) is correct. I do not discount as impossible, however, that there may exist among the products of Biblical criticism challenges to Judaism more potent and fundamental than those I am aware of.

Ephraim Stulberg on Tazria, 5764

The beginning of P’ Tazria, the Torah informs us regarding the laws of a woman who gives birth. Among these is the fact that either forty or eighty days following the birth of a boy or girl, respectively, she must bring two sacrifices, an olah and a chattas. The gemara (Niddah 31b) wonders why the new mother must bring a chattas offering: what sin would she have committed? Rabbi Shimon, in a famous response, explained that at the time a woman is giving birth – apparently a rather uncomfortable experience - she usually swears never again to have relations with her husband. Therefore she must bring a chattas offering, to atone for her sin.

Rav Yosef is puzzled by a number of questions, and he dismisses R’ Shimon’s reasoning. The offering prescribed by the Torah for the new mother is not the same as one required for one who mistakenly violates an oath (see Vayikra 5:4-8). And furthermore, the offering brought by one who violates an oath applies only if such a violation were done unwittingly. In fact, argues Rav Yosef, our new mother ought merely to receive annulment for her vow.

The truth is, as the gemara suggests elsewhere (K’reisos 26a), that Rabbi Shimon is not saying that this chattas offering is literally being brought for the violation of an oath. If this were indeed the case, then why should the Torah have gone out of its way to tell us this law specifically regarding a woman who gives birth. As the Ran points out (Nedarim 4a), even if we were certain that no vow was made, the offerings would still be required. In fact, as the gemara acknowledges, the main character of these offerings is to allow her to eat “kadashim”, meat from sacrifices. Indeed, the gemara seems to completely ignore Rav Yosef’s questions, implying that they do not require any answer. Conversely, one must wonder whether, even if the woman made a vow, it would have any validity, due to the obviously strenuous circumstances under which it was made. In Maseches Nedarim (Ch. 3), the mishna lists a several types of vow which are null and void even without going through a formal nullification process, for the reason that they were obviously intended for another purpose, e.g. as a bargaining tool, or as hyperbole. Perhaps the vow of a woman giving birth would be of the same status. (Do the laws discussed in Nedarim apply to vows (‘sh’vuos’) as well?)

Just as R’ Shimon explains the chattas offering of a woman who bears a child by positing the existence of an actual sin – though perhaps not otherwise technically liable for such a sacrifice – so he explains the chattas offering required of a nazir who actually became “tamei” (see Nedarim 10a). In both situations, though they may not have had any choice in the matter, having been coerced somewhat by external circumstances, these people, the nazir and the mother, allowed themselves to become associated with impure thoughts. The nazir, whose whole purpose in imposing this status upon himself was to remove himself from the physical elements in the world, to elevate himself to a spiritual plane, had come in contact, albeit suddenly and without forewarning, with a corpse, the epitome of humankind’s hopeless physicality. This descent from such a lofty plane of thought is the sin of the nazir. Likewise, though a woman may have had the noblest intentions in conceiving the child, by reconsidering her decision to have relations with her husband, she lowers that relationship by basing it on a scale of pain versus pleasure. Therefore, she too requires a chattas.

Before concluding, I would like to pose a question. The gemara (Nedarim 4a), in discussing the source for the prohibition of “bal t’acher” (i.e. delaying the bringing of one’s sacrifice for a certain time) regarding the sacrifices of a nazir, asks why we don’t simply derive it from the general verse describing the prohibition of “bal t’acher” by other chatta’os (D’varim 23:22), that is from the words “ki darosh yidr’shenu” (see Rosh Hashana 5b). It answers that whereas a regular chattas is brought for a sin, the chattas of a nazir – and a new mother, for that matter – does not. Perhaps this is a foolish question - though if so then it wouln’t be my first – but how does the gemara know that the paradigmatic chattas discussed in D’varim 23:22 is indeed talking about one which comes as an atonement? Tosafos in Rosh Hashana explain how the words “ki darosh yidr’shenu” imply a chattas, and it isn’t clear at all that their explanation would be any more applicable to a regular sin offering (“chattas cheilev”) than to the non-atonement chattas offerings ofa nazir or mother. According to the second answer given by Tosafos, i.e. that it says “ki darosh darash” by the chattas offering burnt by the sons of Aharon, then it would depend on which of the offerings was indeed burnt. Which ties in nicely with what we discussed last week.

The Orthodoxy Test #23: Reading Nonliterally

Reading difficult Torah stories nonliterally is

a) a perversion of Torah
b) sometimes but rarely a valid approach
c) occasionally ok, but makes me uncomfortable
d) ok if you can sort of back yourself up with an obscure Rishon
e) often necessary to make Torah understandable in light of science
f) Leave this question out of my results

I don't remember how I answered this one. I may have chosen (f). I don't even know what it means. I think there's a big difference between saying that a story in Chumash is nonliteral (which may indeed occasionally be okay, but I don't know) and saying that a story in the Talmud or Midrash, for example, is not literally true. In the latter case, given that Rambam and others explicitly state that much of the aggadic material in rabbinic literature is not meant to be taken literally, I'm quite comfortable with it.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Indecision, n. The chief element of success; "for whereas," said Sir Thomas Brewbold, "there is but one way to do nothing and divers ways to do something, whereof, to a surety, only one is the right way, it followeth that he who from indecision standeth still hath not so many chances of going astray as he who pusheth forwards" - a most clear and satisfactory exposition of the matter.

"Your prompt decision to attack," said General Grant on a certain occasion to General Gordon Granger, "was admirable; you had but five minutes to make up your mind in."

"Yes, sir," answered the victorious subordinate, "it is a great thing to know exactly what to do in an emergency. When in doubt whether to attack or retreat I never hesitate a moment - I toss up a copper."

"Do you mean to say that's what you did this time?"

"Yes, General; but for Heaven's sake don't reprimand me: I disobeyed the coin."

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"I'm sort of a faded jock. He's sort of a fading...."

- JJ, re. guidance counselor Phil Roberts

The Orthodoxy Test #22: Chareidi Isolationism

Isolationist chassidic and chareidi enclaves like New Square

a) epitomize the proper approach to avodas Hashem
b) are not for me, but I wish I was on that level
c) are not for me, but I understand the attraction
d) have some good points, but the bad outweighs the good
e) showcase all that is negative about Orthodoxy
f) Leave this question out of my results

First, please note that I have no knowledge of New Square, aside from the fact that they make milk and juice.

I chose (c). (A) and (b) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally superior to others, which I do not believe. I have been taught that within orthodox Judaism, different lifestyles are appropriate for different people; this view coincides nicely with my experience. I would therefore consider the burden of proof to be on any party arguing in favour of such superiority.

(D) and (e) imply that intrinsically, such communities are morally inferior to others, which I also do not believe, for the same reasons that lead me to reject (a) and (b) (see last paragraph).

(C), happily, makes no value judgment about isolationism. The first half of it - "are not for me" - is definitely true. The second half - "but I understand the attraction" - is also true. I have known people who feel intensely uncomfortable when confronted with lifestyles, points of view or practices different from their own. I myself have experienced a certain thrill and passion when submerged within a like-minded community. I therefore can understand why some people would find an isolationist enclave attractive.

Note that by choosing (c), I in no way condone any hostility, prejudice, feeling of superiority or offensive behaviour that is reputed to exist among certain such communities.

Ephraim Stulberg on Shemini, 5764

There is a confusing incident in the middle of this week’s parasha - and the middle of the Torah as well! - involving the burning of one of the chattas offerings following the death of the eldest sons of Aharon. On the heels of the deaths of Nadav and Avihu, Moshe had first told Aharon and his remaining sons that they should nonetheless eat the mincha offering, “for so I was commanded” (10:13). Next, he tells them to eat their allotted portions from the sh’lamim offering, “as Hashem commended” (10:15). Finally, we find that when Moshe searched for the chattas offering, he discovered it had been burnt. Thereupon he demanded to know why the sons of Aharon had decided upon such a course of action, exclaiming: “you should [have] eat[en] it in a Holy place, as I have commanded” (10:18). Aharon responded to Moshe, justifying their behaviour, and the latter was satisfied. The question which we must ask is, why did Moshe employ three different phrases – “for so I was commanded,” “as Hashem commanded”, “as I commanded” - to describe the imperatives issued in this incident?

The Sifra on these verses (also cited in Yoma 5b, Z’vachim 101a) notes the three different types of command referred to in the three verses, and comments as follows: “ ‘For so I was commanded’ – that you should eat it as an onein (someone whose relative had just died that day, who is usually prohibited from eating holy meat); ‘As I commanded’ at the time of the act; ‘As Hashem commanded’ – it is not I who is commanding this by myself.”

The Tosafos Y’shanim in Yoma explain that the comment of the Sifra, “it is not I who is commanding you this by myself”, i.e. I’m not making this up, in fact occurred after the whole blowup over the chattas, even though it is written beforehand. They cite the well known maxim of “ein mukdam u-m’uchar ba-torah” (see P’sachim 6b, as well as the discussion in our e-mail on P’ B’reishis). Thus, according to the Sifra, the incident occurred this way: Moshe heard the command from Hashem permitting the exceptional eating of “kadashim” in a state of “animus” regarding only the mincha, a command which he repeated to Aharon, assuming that Aharon would apply this exception to the chattas as well. When the latter did not in fact do so, but rather burnt the offering, Moshe became upset, until his brother explained to him the difference between the mincha and chattas – i.e. whereas the former was a special offering, arising out of the unique commandments pertaining to the consecration of the Tabernacle, the latter was not, and thus perhaps not subject to the exception stated regarding the mincha. Once Moshe realized that he had indeed forgotten this distinction, he informed Aharon that the sh’lamim, which had also been brought specially for the consecration, could be eaten by the kohanim: the law which he’d heard from Hashem had explicitly pertained to all such special offerings, though perhaps only the mincha had been mentioned by name.

This explanation of the Sifra helps us to understand several other details as well. For instance, where exactly did Moshe command Aharon to eat the chattas offering that he should have said “as I commanded”? No such explicit command is mentioned in the Torah. If we assume that Moshe is referring to the commands relating to the mincha and shl’amim, then we must wonder how he could have assumed that Aharon should have made any inference regarding the chattas at all, since we have a rule that if a certain detail is mentioned pertaining to two items, and two items alone, then we may not deduce from these two cases a generally applicable principle (‘sh’nei k’suvim ein m’lamdim’), as if this were so, it would have been sufficient to state even a single case, from which we would deduce all similar cases. But if we posit that Moshe issued only a single explicit directive, i.e. regarding the mincha, then he would have been justified in assuming that Aharon would have applied that law to all other cases.

Making use of this passage in the Sifra, one might perhaps begin to attempt to understand the puzzling explanation of the Targum Pseudo-Yonasan dealing with this incident, which states that Aharon and his sons burnt all three of the chattas offerings brought that day: that of the prince, Nachshon ben Aminadav, that of the Rosh Chodesh mussaf service, and that prescribed specially for the consecration of the Tabernacle. If Moshe had indeed seen that Aharon had only burnt the mussaf offering, which was a standard offering, not subject, perhaps, to the special exemption against the prohibition of “onein”, but had eaten the other two, special, offerings, he would not have felt it necessary to rehash the dispensation for the eating of the special sh’lamim. Thus it must be that Aharon had burnt all three offerings, having seen the edibility of the mincha as a special law from which no general conclusions were deducible; indeed, the usual rule is that we do not derive other laws from a “halacha l’Moshe mi-Sinai. Though this opinion of Yonasan is clearly not the opinion of the Sifra, which holds that only the chattas of the mussaf service was burned, nonetheless the same question which troubled the Sifra regarding the different expressions of command used in the Torah might perhaps have also compelled the Targum to its unique understanding. (See the Peirush Yonasan for another explanation of Yonasan’s interpretation.)

From The Devil's Dictionary

Incumbent, n. A person of the liveliest interest to the outcumbents.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"This is my impression of a t.v. newscaster over the past few days: 'Our top story: Princess Diana: still dead....'"

- MF the Elder

The Jewish Faith Requirement

The following (except for the bracketed words) is taken directly from "Living Up to the Truth," by Rabbi Dr. Dovid Gottlieb. I quoted it (somewhat inaccurately, I might add) in a discussion I had recently with the brother of a fellow blogger.

If all we have is greater probability [that Judaism is correct] than alternatives, does this justify absolute belief? What of the principles of Jewish belief which state: “I believe with a perfect faith that...”? Here we are suffering from a mistranslation: ma’amin and emuna in Hebrew do not mean faith but rather faithfulness - living faithfully to an idea or principle. Proof texts: Genesis 15:6; Exodus 19:9; Numbers 14:11, 20:12; Deut. 28:66; Psalms 116:10, 119:66; Job 4:18, 15:15, among others. When there is enough evidence to justify the decision to act, then we should act with perfect faithfulness. Once the evidence favors surgery, the operation should be carried out without compromise. Jewish belief demands complete faithfulness to principles for which we have adequate evidence of truth.

Update on Chazal-Science Sources

I've added some information concerning the Ran. See here or here.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Incompossible, adj. Unable to exist if something else exists. Two things are incompossible when the world of being has scope enough for one of them, but not enough for both - as Walt Whitman's poetry and God's mercy to man. Incompossibility, it will be seen, is only incompatibility let loose. Instead of such low language as "Go heel yourself - I mean to kill you on sight," the words, "Sir, we are incompossible," would convey an equally significant intimation and in stately courtesy are altogether superior.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Gee - I wonder what came over them. Maybe after two and a half weeks it started to smell."

- RBC, re. Princess Diana's death no longer being front-page story

From The Devil's Dictionary

Impiety, n. Your irreverence toward my deity.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Birshus hakohen"

- JBP, benching, lifting own kippah

Quote

"I never had any serious conversations with Owens because I never went into bars."

- Lonnie Smith, on his former manager, Paul Owens

Pre-HWMNBN-Era QUOTI #2

"Amelia Bedelia. That's what we should call you; your jokes are just like hers."

-REBP to AMB. To be honest, I can't claim that those were his exact words, as the quote originated somewhere in the neighbourhood of 13 years ago, and I didn't write it down. But it was something to that effect. The motivation for my recalling the quote now was during Sunday's baseball game when someone picked up the plastic bag serving as first base, and then made a comment about a different meaning of "stealing first base", which alluded to an Amelia Bedelia story in which she was playing baseball and she was told to stop someone from stealing a base, so she picked up the base to prevent it from being stolen. Hey, I just relized that I have the same initials as Amelia Bedeila, if you ignore my middle name!

Pre-HWMNBN-Era QUOTI

"Immediately, if not sooner!"

-DD the math teacher, who incidentally also taught HWMNBN's mother and aunt.

QUOTI-Alumni

"I'm the temporary permanent pitcher."

-DES/LV/HWMNBN, at Sunday's baseball game, when he was serving as pitcher for both teams.

Quote

"Our phenoms aren't phenomenating."

- Lefty Phillips, explaining his team's bad year

From The Devil's Dictionary

Impenitence, n. A state of mind intermediate in point of time between sin and punishment.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Mekalkel bechaburah: when you damage in a group."

- DR

This Post is for Starting Controversies

I discovered that some of the most exciting stuff on this blog are the vicious arguments. Therefore, I am creating a new feature. If someone feels like instigating, simply post your beef and people will argue.
Here is my Bli-Neder guarantee: If you instigate I will take up the opposing side of the argument.

To get the ball rolling:
Babies are ugly.

Bible Criticism: Follow-Up

The following post is taken directly from a comment I just posted to "The Orthodoxy Test #21: Bible Critics" in response to an earlier comment to the same post. I feel the topic is sufficiently interesting and important (and that I have enough to say about it) for it to deserve a post of its own.

Please be aware that the site to which I link below (daatemet.org) is, unless I am mistaken, a site dedicated to convincing orthodox Jews to abandon orthodoxy (or maybe Judaism entirely; I'm not sure).

I read the article (in English - the translation is at times a bit clumsy) by Naftali Zeligman to which I believe Mr. Holloway was referring (it can be found here). Most of it is, I think, correct, and in fact I was taught much of the information it contains in my Intro to Bible course at Y.U. (which was a superb course; I will again express my appreciation for it to my professor, Dr. Moshe Bernstein). I think that most of its contents are worthwhile knowledge for people who aren't yet familiar with the material it contains. I object to a few of its assertions, however. To wit:

1. See the paragraphs beginning "Go and see" and "Understand: Reish Lakish", in which Mr. Zeligman cites the record in Tractate Soferim of the discrepancy found in three Torah scrolls - two scrolls had one reading, one had another - resulting in the authorities' deciding in favour of the reading of the two (the majority). Mr. Zeligman comments, "Perhaps it was the two books that were in error." If one believes that the Torah's origins are divine, then it is not unreasonable to posit that God "fixed," so to speak, the outcome, so that the "proper reading" (whatever that means) would prevail. The process might not have been as prone to error as Mr. Zeligman implies.

2. In the paragraph beginning "One who wants to expand", Mr. Zeligman quotes Dr. Menachem Cohen, who, for all I know, may be entirely correct. I disagree, however, with Mr. Zeligman's summary of his words. Mr. Zeligman interprets Dr. Cohen as saying that "the sanctity of the text [of the Torah] is only a human convention ... for it is clear ... that the Torah text has indeed greatly changed in the course of the centuries." I do not believe that this is what Dr. Cohen writes (nor, more importantly, do I believe that it is the truth). The correct principle, I think, is that the Torah text's sanctity does not derive from any precise sequence of letters and words, but from the fact that a (non-heretical) group of Jews has decided, using the proper halachic process, to accept a particular version of the text as valid. In other words, God (not just the Jewish people) assigns sanctity to our text of the Torah because we, following the procedure God wants us to follow, have adopted this text. God similarly would have assigned sanctity to variant texts when they were in use as a result of the correctly applied halachic method. The sanctity of the text is not a "human convention," as Mr. Zeligman would have us believe. It's very divine; it just doesn't work as simplistically as we might have been taught it did in elementary school (or yeshiva gedolah!).

3. Mr. Zeligman, in the paragraphs beginning "Then the high", "The great lights", "Thus wrote the", "Even the Cuzari" and "And though the", discusses the report in the book of Kings of the discovery of a Torah scroll in the Temple. He quotes largely from mainstream orthodox sources, but at the very end attacks the Kuzari's assertion that the Torah was forgotten by most, but not all, of the nation: Mr. Zeligman says that it was entirely forgotten by all, and that the Kuzari, in claiming that a small number of Jews had preserved their religious tradition, was just hypothesizing wildly and desperately to make excuses for his own belief. I would first point out that this issue seems not to be directly related to the accuracy of our written Torah. More importantly, however, I find it quite difficult to believe - all religious convictions aside - that over the course of, let's say, 60 years, there was such a complete and utter destruction of the Jewish religious traditions (which the same book of Kings records were firmly entrenched under King Hezekiah, King Manasseh's immediate predecessor) that no one - not one single person - was familiar with the old ways and beliefs. Is there any record of such a thing ever happening - of a long-held national belief system being completely supplanted, vanishing without a trace, in little more than half a century? I can't think of any such instance, but I know of many counter-examples. Thus, I find the Kuzari's supposition far more plausible than Mr. Zeligman's.

(Additionally, if, again, we assume that the Torah was given initially by divine revelation and that God was "behind" it, one would assume that God would have ensured that his instructions would not have been totally forgotten. But I think the Kuzari's argument stands firmly even if one leaves this consideration aside.)

Addendum: The correct parts of Mr. Zeligman's article, while challenging to various beliefs held by many orthodox Jews, do not undermine the validity of Judaism. To me this is obvious; if anyone wants elaboration, ask a question in the comments and I'll respond (or change my position, if need be!).

The Dark Lord's Dictionary

Hypocritical, n. A very important African mammal.

Baseball Quote

"With the Padres, you'd get off to a four-and-one start, and that would be the highlight of the year."

- Steve Mura

From The Devil's Dictionary

Impartial, adj. Unable to perceive any promise of personal advantage from espousing either side of a controversy or adopting either of two conflicting opinions.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"That was excellently [bad]/[wrong]."

- SG, giving "OK" sign

Stupid or just plain dumb?

Here's a halakhic question for the peanut gallery: does sending this form violate one of Maimonides' thirteen articles of faith?

There's just one thing I don't understand here. If you are "asking the Rebbe shlit"a King Moshiach" to grant your request, why bother "pray[ing] to G-d to hasten the revelation of the Rebbe King Moshaich"?

Oh, I know. Because they're nuts.

Earth to 770: He's not there!

הערב באמצע הכינוס השנתי ליהודים ישראליים, נפרס
שטיח מהודר לכניסת הרבי שליט"א מלך המשיח, וכן בסיום התפלה

"That evening, in the middle of the annual conference for Israeli (presumably Lubavitch) Jews, an elegant carpet was rolled out for the entrance of the Rebbe, King Messiah; the same thing was done at the conclusion of the prayers." (Free translation.)

Read all about it at the Hebrew-language Chabad website.

Note: Someone should tell the kid with the video camera that, like all undead creatures of the night, the King Messiah does not appear on film or videotape.

A Page Out of the Vatican's Playbook?

This site contains the account - from the back of Lawrence Kelemen's Permission to Receive - of Rabbi Kelemen's correspondence with the Roman Catholic Church about several apparent inconsistencies within the New Testament. The Church referred Rabbi Kelemen to two books by Dr. Raymond E. Brown, both bearing the Vatican's stamp of approval. The site quotes a few different ideas from Dr. Brown's books, including the assumption that Jesus' birth was not virginal (contrary to popular Christian belief). Dr. Brown cautions, however, that "we should not underestimate the adverse pedagogical impact on the understanding of divine sonship if the virginal conception is denied." And the site reports that

"Brown also considers the possibility that Christianity's founders intended to create the impression that an actual virginal conception took place. Early Christians needed just such a myth, Brown notes, since Mary was widely known to have delivered Jesus too early: 'Unfortunately, the historical alternative to the virginal conception has not been a conception in wedlock; it has been illegitimacy.' Brown writes that:

"Some sophisticated Christians could live with the alternative of illegitimacy; they would see this as the ultimate stage in Jesus' emptying himself and taking on the form of a servant, and would insist, quite rightly, that an irregular begetting involves no sin by Jesus himself. But illegitimacy would destroy the images of sanctity and purity with which Matthew and Luke surround Jesus' origins and would negate the theology that Jesus came from the pious Anawim of Israel. For many less sophisticated believers, illegitimacy would be an offense that would challenge the plausibility of the Christian mystery." [emphasis added]

I quote this because of recent events in orthodox Jewish circles. The devoutly Catholic sentiments of Dr. Brown - his fears of the consequences of revealing the unromanticised facts about Christian doctrine to the public - make me think of the banning of Rabbi Nosson Slifkin's books (and of Rabbi Nathan Kamenetsky's The Making of a Godol), which it seems likely was for almost exactly the same reasons.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Immortality, n.
  
A toy which people cry for,
And on their knees apply for,
Dispute, contend and lie for,
     And if allowed
     Would be right proud
Eternally to die for.
                         G.J.
 

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Chemists never die. They just increase in entropy."

- MF the Elder

Ephraim Stulberg on Chol Hamo'ed Pesach 5765

The final six days of Pesach are somewhat peculiar in that we only recite a “semi-Hallel” during the morning prayers. The gemara (Arachin 10a) explains that this is because the mussaf offering is unvarying throughout all the days of Pesach; in a sense, the whole of Pesach is like one long day, not calling for a completely renewed expression of praise. This is in contradistinction with Sukkos, where the mussaf sacrifices of each day are unique.

The Bais Yosef (O.C. 490) offers an additional explanation. He cites Shibbolei Ha-leqet, who brings a midrash to the effect that since Pesach is at least partially about the demise of the Egyptians, and we are chided by the Torah against rejoicing at the downfall of our enemies (Mishlei 24:17), it would be improper to sing to vociferously in praise of the Exodus miracle. Of the two reasons, it is the second, it seems to me, that has come to be most commonly accepted; and I thought it worthwhile to comment on it at some length, as it appears to be a point of some theological significance.

Aside from the rather obscure midrash quoted by the Shibbolei Ha-leqet, the most obvious proof for this understanding of the half-Hallel’s recitation on Pesach is the gemara’s statement (Megilla 10b) that on the night the Egyptians drowned in the Red Sea, the angels wished to sing before God; God, however, could not abide this exhibition of joy. “My creatures are drowning in the sea, and you wish to sing?” he exclaimed. Clearly, then, it is wrong to sing about the demise of others, even though their intentions against us may have been less than benevolent. In contrast to this somewhat relevant proof, there seems to be an ample supply of evidence to suggest that it is indeed proper to cheer on the destruction of malignant enemies. When Haman confronted his nemesis with words of rebuke over the latter’s glee at his awkward situation, Mordechai answered that this rule applies only to Jews, not Gentiles (Megilla 16a). As well, we find that King David did not say “Hallelujah!” until he saw the downfall of the wicked (B’rachos 9b). And, rather obviously, the Jews really did recite songs upon their redemption, both the “Az Yashir” and Hallel (see P’sachim 117a).

Thus we find that Maharsha (B’rachos 9b) rejects the Bais Yosef’s explanation outright. He finds nothing immoral about rejoicing at the downfall of those who tried to do us in. Why then did God reprimand the angels for wishing to sing before Him? I suppose one might suggest that it is simply improper to rejoice over the demise of a fellow being unless one has a stake in it. The angels were not threatened by the Egyptians; such joy might appear to border on maliciousness. Alternatively, it might be said that the angels were chastised from rejoicing while the Egyptians were still suffering in their slow descent to the depths. While one is allowed to celebrate one’s freedom from tyranny, even at the expense of a fellow human being, this is only so after the redemption has already taken place, and the suffering of one’s foes has concluded. To gloat over the pain of the Egyptians would have been simply cruel.

Indeed, the entire issue of whether or not the angels did sing at the miracle of the Reed Sea is itself the subject of debate. The Mechilta (Ha-shira, at the very end of ch.1) states that the angels did in fact sing along with the Jews. This appears from the text of the Mechilta to be the opinion of R’ Meir. And indeed, we find elsewhere that R’ Meir, in particular, had no qualms about wishing ill on his enemies. Thus the gemara (B’rachos 10a) cites an incident in which a particular heretic was giving R’ Meir a hard time. R’ Meir began to ask God to destroy his persecutor, whereupon his sage wife, B’ruria, explained to him that one should not seek the destruction of the wicked, but rather their rehabilitation. In short, the desirability of an enemy’s destruction was the subject of an argument between R’ Meir and his wife. And we all know how that must have ended.

(The inspiration for this email is a series of dinner discussion I had a few years ago with R' Reich of the Kollel Avreichim.)

From The Devil's Dictionary

Imagination, n. A warehouse of facts, with poet and liar in joint ownership.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"The mafionnaire, Mr. Gambino, after a hard day of making people offers they can't refuse...."

- RBP, re. Ben Drusai

The Orthodoxy Test #20: Cell Phones

Cell phones are

a) a source of batala and terrible images
b) a disruptive influence that should be avoided by serious yeshiva bochurim
c) problematic, but the good outweighs the bad
d) really fine, but I understand the concerns
e) just cell phones. I don't even understand why this is a question
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). I understand concerns with cell phones; I've seen people waste copious amounts of time with them, and I'm sure that people can do even more dastardly things with them, if they are so inclined and lack sufficient self-control. See what I wrote about #18 (television and movies) and #19 (the internet). The same applies here, except that I would classify a cell phone as a tool, rather than a medium. This distinction, however, is irrelevant. Just as one can use a hammer to build a sukkah or to smash annoying people over the head, so too cell phones can be put both to permissible, even desirable, and to forbidden uses. The tool itself is not intrinsically good or evil; one must ensure that one employs it, like any other tool, properly.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Idleness, n. A model farm where the devil experiments with seeds of new sins and promotes the growth of staple vices.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Would you like some wax?"

- ES, offering apples

When Did They Eat the Korban Pesach?

By Ephraim Stulberg

The sequence of the modern-day Passover Seder is based on a number of key halakhic assumptions. When even a single detail is added, however, the entire framework requires adjustment. This phenomenon can be most readily perceived when we examine the theories of the medieval talmudists regarding the order of the Passover meal during the Temple era, when the Pascal lamb was still offered.

Maimonides, in Chapter Eight of his Hilkhos Hametz U-matza, describes an order not unlike our present one. The matza and marror are eaten first - either as a combination or separately - and are then followed by the meat of the hagiga sacrifice and the Pascal lamb. This is followed by the main course, which concludes with the eating of a final k’zayis of lamb. Why the lamb is not eaten in the "sandwich" is a question that bothered Ra'avad and Lehem Mishneh. Hillel's famous dish, which we commemorate in our own version of the Seder, strangely appears not to include the Pesah offering at all! Perhaps this has something to do with the idea that the Pesah offering must be eaten in a state of satiety.

Mordekhai ben Hillel (33b, column 2 of the standard Vilna edition) was also bothered by this issue: how do we square the idea that the lamb must be eaten once already "satisfied" with the fact that it is supposed to be eaten as part of a sandwich? His solution is an intriguing one: he suggests that the ancients used to fill up on non-hametz breads (which would not qualify as matza to the extent that they would fulfill the commandment of eating matza) and then eat the rest of the meal, leaving the Pascal offering and the matza and marror for the very end. Why we don't we maintain this order nowadays, saving the korekh for the tsafun stage? Mordekhai explains that while it would be theoretically permissible to eat matza ashira at the beginning of the meal, we are afraid of being unable to resist the urge to fill ourselves with that tastier variety of matza.

Tosafos (P’sahim 120a) also take the view that the sandwich was consumed at the very end of the meal. They argue that the matza eaten at the beginning of the meal would have indeed technically fulfilled the commandment of eating matza, and thus the blessing of "al akhilas matza" would have been recited at that stage; but the real fulfillment of the mitzva would not come until the end of the meal. They compare this situation to that of shofar, where the blessings are recited over the initial blasts, even though the ones heard during the t'filla are the main ones.

The difficulty with Tosafos’ approach is that it would make the second matza-eating merely of a lesser degree than the other ingredients in the sandwich, which is problematic (see P'sahim 115a). This debate is also relevant nowadays. According to the Tosafists and Mordekhai, the afikoman which we eat, at least at first glance, ought to require accompaniment with the bitter herbs and haroses, to commemorate the sandwich which was eaten at the end of the meal in ancient times. The fact that it is eaten alone, writes the Rosh, is proof that Tosafos’ order is incorrect.

Trust me, it was a mistake!

The following article appeared in the Tuesday, April 11th, 2006 edition of the Ottawa Citizen:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Man Gets $218 Trillion Phone Bill

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) -- A Malaysian man said he nearly fainted when he recieved a $218 trillion phone bill and was ordered to pay up within 10 days or face prosecution, a newspaper reported Monday.

Yahaya Wahab said he disconnected his late father's phone line in January after he died and settled the $23 bill, the New Straits Times reported.
But Telekom Malaysia later sent him a $218 trillion bill for recent telephone calls along with orders to settle within 10 days or face legal proceedings, the newspaper reported.

It wasn't clear whether the bill was a mistake, or if Yahaya's father's phone line was used illegally after his death.

"If the company wants to seek legal action as mentioned in the letter, I'm ready to face it," the paper quoted Yahaya as saying. "In fact, I can't wait to face it," he said.

Yahaya, from northern Kedah state, received a notice from the company's debt-collection agency in early April, the paper said. Yahaya said he nearly fainted when he saw the new bill.

Government-linked Telekom Malaysia Bhd. is the country's largest telecommunications company.

A company official, who declined to be identified as she was not authorized to speak to the media, said Telekom Malaysia was aware of Yahaya's case and would address it. She did not provide further details.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I would just like to draw your attention to the line: "It wasn't clear whether the bill was a mistake, or if Yahaya's father's phone line was used illegally after his death."

It wasn't clear if the bill was a mistake?

What morons!! As my father so candidly pointed out, the yearly gross domestic product of Malaysia is probably less than that telephone bill, and yet they aren't sure if the "bill was a mistake or if Yahaya's father's phone line was used illegally after his death." In fact I just looked it up and Malaysia's GDP in 2004 was 118 billion dollars (US), only about 217 trillion short of Mr. Yahaya's phone bill. My goodness, can't they just take a leap of faith and assume that the bill was a mistake?

Actually, if you add up the GDP of every county in the entire world for the year 2004, it only equals 40 trillion dollars and they are not sure if Yahaya's phone bill was five and a half times the GDP of the ENTIRE WORLD?

The Orthodoxy Test #19: The Internet

The Internet is

a) a terrible destructive force and assur
b) really bad, but ok for parnassa
c) not great, but ok in moderation
d) perfectly fine
e) a great invention that increased worldwide Torah availability
f) Leave this question out of my results

Once again, the problem with many of these options is that they assume that the internet is a monolithic entity, when in fact it is merely a medium. Proposing, for example, that the internet is "assur" ((a)) is like proposing that books are "assur." Some (the good ones) are, and some aren't. The fact that some books are halachically undesirable does not negate the potential value - and permissibility - of the medium. Basically, my reaction is the same as it was to #18 - the one about television and movies (which see). I choose (d). The internet is as "perfectly fine" as many, many other things most of us deal with on a regular basis; as always, the important question is how one uses it.

Ephraim Stulberg on the Siyum, 5765

Just a quick thought pertaining to the siyum recitation from this morning. The purpose of mentioning the ten sons of Rav Papa is rather obscure. Yam Shel Shlomo explains the names midrashically, referring to the Ten Commandments and the ten statements with which the world was created. This seems rather unsatifactory.

I found it written in the ancient Geonic work, Seder Tannaim ve-amoraim, that all of Rav Papa's sons died on a single day, in what was obviously a massacre of some sort (Rav Papa himself outlived them all). It seems possible that we recite these names as inspiring examples of individuals whose love of Torah cost them their lives.

(While Rabbi Yochanan also lost ten sons in his lifetime - see B'rachos 5b - there is no indication that they died from persecution.)

Ephraim Stulberg on Shir Hashirim, 5765

The topic of banning books is one that has gained some currency in recent years among Orthodox Jews, as certain sectors of the population have quickly sought to condemn works which do not subscribe to their own viewpoint. This is not the first time in Jewish history that these sorts of controversies have arisen, however, and it is instructive to examine how such matters were dealt with in ancient times.

Of the twenty-four books that comprise the Jewish Holy Writ, four of them were discussed as possible candidates for banning. The book of Yechezkel, compiled by Ezra (Bava Basra 15a), contains descriptions of the sacrificial services which seem to contradict Torah regulations, and at some point came under consideration for blacklisting some time around the year 100 BCE, in the time of Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel (Shabbos 13b). At that time, a scholar named Channaniya ben Chizkiya ben Garon devoted himself to explaining away all the contradictions.

The gemara (Shabbos 30b) also records that at some point, Mishlei and Koheles came under fire for their internal contradictions. The controversy surrounding Koheles occurred first; after the scholars saw that the book both began and ended with an endorsement of the Torah way of life, they figured perhaps they ought to make more of an effort to reconcile the difficult passages of the work. After they succeeded in this endeavour, they turned to Mishlei and, by now wary of precipitately banning books, they eventually resolved the difficulties in this other work of King Solomon.

In Avos De-Rabbi Nasan (1:4), we find a different account of these events. It explains that when we are told (Mishlei 25:1) that the scholars of King Chizkiya’s generation “he-etiqu” the proverbs of King Solomon, it means not only that that they transcribed them. The word “he-etiqu” also means either that they waited, “aged”, or that they restrained themselves, removed themselves from what they had initially desired to do. They were “patient in judgment”, as the mishna (Avos 1:2) urges all public men to be. In this account Shir Ha-shirim, in addition to Mishlei and Koheles, came up for possible disqualification. It was not the contradictions, but rather the seemingly heretical or pornographic nature of some of the material, that initially had the sages tending in favour of blacklisting these books. Eventually, however, after they examined his words more carefully, descriptions such as “minus” (Vayikra Rabbah 28:1) were no longer deemed appropriate.

Even in much later times, the sages argued over whether these three philosophical works of King Solomon were really of the same calibre as the other books of Scripture. Rabbi Shimon ben M’nassia compared Koheles to the Book of Ben Sira, a profane collection of idioms and proverbs which has no special halachic status regarding how one ought to handle it (Tosefta,Yadayim 2:6). Other sages suggested that Shir Ha-shirim might not be as holy as the other books of the Torah. Of course, in the end they were all accepted as integral parts of TaNa”CH. But their story surely teaches us the importance of sober and unbiased deliberation before arriving at such drastic judgments. As the midrash goes on to teach (in Avos De-Rabbi Nasan), even the wisest of men, even Moshe Rabbeinu himself, will appear forgetful and foolish when they allow their emotions to get the better of them.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Idiot, n. A member of a large and powerful tribe whose influence in human affairs has always been dominant and controlling. The Idiot's activity is not confined to any special field of thought or action, but "pervades and regulates the whole." He has the last word in everything; his decision is unappealable. He sets the fashions of opinion and taste, dictates the limitations of speech and circumscribes conduct with a dead-line.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"All right! Communal bisslis!"

- HK, re. shared bissli bag

Pun-chlines - Round III

Here are some more classic punchlines that require original jokes...

1. "What do you mean, it's hard to tune a fish? Just adjust its scales!"

2. "I had no Monet to buy Degas to make the Van Gogh."

3. "Why, that's a nic nac, Patty Stack; give that frog a loan."

Condolences

Condolences to Mrs. Leah Bulka on the death of her mother.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Iconoclast, n. A breaker of idols, the worshipers whereof are imperfectly gratified by the performance, and most strenuously protest that he unbuildeth but doth not reëdify, that he pulleth down but pileth not up. For the poor things would have other idols in place of those he thwacketh upon the mazzard and dispelleth. But the iconoclast saith: "Ye shall have none at all, for ye need them not; and if the rebuilder fooleth round hereabout, behold I will depress the head of him and sit thereon till he squawk it."

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Mister Guttman, bad news: if you combine Tamas and Yaakov, you get Yakass."

- NG

Ephraim Stulberg on the Seder, 5765

“Behold, I am like a man of seventy years, and yet was unable to prove that the Exodus must be recounted at night…” This statement of R’ Elazar ben Azaryah, a citation from the Mishnah (B’rachos 1:6) which appears in the Hagadah, is somewhat unusual for its recording of a tidbit of autobiographical information. Why should we care how old R’ Elazar was? Why the unusually oblique phrasing of his age? These are famous questions, and they have famous answers. And yet, as we shall see, things are not quite as one might have thought.

The gemara (B’rachos 28a) explains the strange statement of R’ Elazar’s age. On the day he appointed to replace Rabban Gamliel as the Prince, he was a mere eighteen years old. Troubled by his youthful appearance, worried that he would not be able to command the proper respect required for his position, his hair miraculously (?) whitened during the night following his election, and the next day he appeared in the study hall a wizened old man of seventy.

This is all nice and fine, but what then was R’ Elazar’s point when he stated that he was “like a man of seventy” and yet had still not succeeded in proving his contention regarding recalling the Exodus at night? The fact is that he had not really spent seventy years trying to gain acceptance of his point; indeed, he was barely of legal drinking age.

The Talmud Yerushalmi (B’rachos 1:6) also addresses the question of R’ Elazar’s age. It comments that R’ Elazar was remarkable for having achieved such old age in spite of his many years serving in a position of authority. The implication seems to be that R’ Elazar was in fact commenting on his actual age; he really had lived a long time, trying to prove this halachic point.

Can we square these two seemingly conflicting positions? Well, let’s at least give it a shot. There is an indication, it seems to me, that this sort of comment on his age was somewhat of a catchphrase for R’ Elazar. The Mechilta (P’ Bo, ch. 16) relates the following story: On one occasion, R’ Yehoshua was unable to attend the scholarly discussions in Yavneh. When his students returned from the assembly, he asked them who had spoken that Shabbos. They replied that it had been R’ Elazar, and they relayed to him some of the Prince’s words of Torah. Upon hearing all this, R’ Yehoshua declared: “Is there anything more novel than this? Behold, I am like a man of seventy years, and I had never heard of this until today! Fortunate are you, Avraham our Father, that Elazar ben Azaryah has descended from you!”

There are several possible ways in which we might explain R’ Yehoshua’s usage of this peculiar expression, but it seems to me that the context of his statement – in response to a lecture of R’ Elazar – implies that it was no mere coincidence that he chose to use it on this particular occasion. He was obviously making a subtle reference to R’ Elazar’s idiosyncratic catchphrase.

When the Talmud Bavli notes how R’ Elazar said only that he was “like” a man of seventy, it is not referring to the specific artifact of this statement found in the mishnah in the first chapter of B’rachos; in that particular instance, it seems clear that R’ Elazar had in fact already aged significantly over the years, and was approaching seventy, as the Yerushalmi explains. Rather, the Bavli is referring to the general practice that R’ Elazar had of referring to his age, and of doing so in such a queer fashion.

Ephraim Stulberg on Shabbat Chol Hamoed Pesach, 5764

I’m not really sure what to write this week. The most fruitful source of material would have been the Haggadah, but I suppose that’s not of much good to you now. I could also write about the Torah reading for the seventh day, dealing with the song of Moshe following the splitting of the Reed Sea, but that’s still off in the future a bit. So I thought I’d try to write about both. Surely you can see the logic in that decision: sort of like the fellow who's sitting on a block of ice with his head on fire, who feels fine on average.

At the end of the Maggid section of the Haggadah, we begin the recitation of the Hallel, which we introduce with the passage: “Therefore, we are obligated to praise…Him, who performed for our fathers and for us all these miracles: He took us out from Egypt… And so, let us say in front of Him “shira chadasha” ”. Following this, we recite two paragraphs of the Hallel, and finish with the blessing of “Ga’al Yisra’el”, which we conclude by beseeching Hashem to redeem us once again, “and we will give praise to you with a “shir chadash”, on our saviour and the redemption of our souls.” My wife asked me why one passage has it as “shira”, while the other has it “shir”. What’s the difference between these two terms, which seem to mean the same thing?

Abudarham addresses this discrepancy in his commentary on the conclusion of the blessing of “emes v’yatziv” in the weekly Shacharis service. He notes that the second passage speaks of our ultimate redemption, whereas the first spoke only of the redemption from Egypt. Citing the Midrash Chazis (Shir Hashirim Rabbah 1:8), he observes that when the Jews left Egypt, they inherited only the land of the Seven Nations – a mere 1/10 of the seventy nations of the world – just as a female receives a tenth of her father’s property (?). Therefore, Moshe and the Jews sang “this ‘shira’ ”, in a feminine form. But in the future, they will inherit the entire world of seventy nations, just like a son can inherit all of his father’s property: thus the masculine “shir”.

As an alternative explanation, he cites the Mechilta (B’shalach 1), which says that the song of Moshe and the Jews was called “shira” because just as a woman will become pregnant and give birth over and over; so, too, would the Jews be redeemed over and over, until the final redemption, which is designated a male form, for just as males do not give birth, so also will there be no redemption after that last one.

One might perhaps refuse such an explanation on the grounds that it is not the redemption which is being described in either masculine or feminine gender, but rather the songs sung in appreciation of them. Yet such a difficulty is merely superficial. As the Malbim notes in his commentary on Tehillim 96:1, this idea of a “new song” is a profound one. By this term we refer to a song praising Hashem for His constant involvement in this world, for His perpetual renewal of the forces and energies which make the world run its “natural” course. The song referred to is a song which exists independently of human recognition of it. It is not so much a new song as it is a “song of newness”, a testimony to the extent of God’s involvement with the world. “Sing for Hashem a new song, for he has made wonders… The sea and its denizens will roar, the world and all that dwell in it. The rivers will clap their hands, in unison will the mountains sing.” (Tehillim 98). This apprehension of God’s interest in the affairs of man is one of the key lessons of the Exodus story, as Ramban notes in his commentary at the end of P’ Bo. Thus when we sing the “song of newness”, we sing of God’s constant concern and activeness in the affairs of man, as exemplified in the redemptions, both past and future. The newness refers to the redemptions, and thus changes from feminine to masculine.

i have nothing to do with this blog, i do not even come to this blog, i was never a part of it and i don't have a computer and never use the internet, also i have never met any of the other bloggers. here is a picture i also have nothing to do with and have never seen.

i have nothing to do with this blog, i do not even come to this blog, i was never a part of it and i don't have a computer and never use the internet, also i have never met any of the other bloggers. here is a picture i also have nothing to do with and have never seen.

Ephraim Stulberg on Pesach, 5765

The gemara (P’sachim 114b) states that the Seder Plate ought to contain two cooked items, one in commemoration of the Pesach offering, and one in commemoration of the Chaggigah offering that was brought alongside it on the fourteenth of Nissan.

The question arises what one ought to do on Shabbos. There is a dispute as to whether the Chaggigah was brought on the 14th even if it occurs on Shabbos. The mishnah (P’sachim 69b) states that it was not brought on Shabbos, the reason being, as the gemara writes, that it is essentially a rabbinic commandment, instituted in order that one come to eat the Pesach lamb on a somewhat satisfied stomach, lest one come to break the bones of the lamb while hungrily searching for more marrow to eat. Rambam (Hilchos Korban Pesach 10:12) accepts this opinion as authoritative.

The opinion of Tosafos, however, is more complex. The gemara (70a) relates that, whereas the tanna of the mishnah held that the Chaggigah of the 14th was essentially a regular peace-offering, Ben Teima was of the opinion that this Chaggigah took on many of the laws of a Pesach offering: it could only be eaten until the morning of the 15th; it could only be eaten roasted; could be brought only from sheep, not cattle; only from males, not females; and must be within its first year. All these specifications are derived from its close connection to the Pesach offering: it is called “the Chaggigah sacrifice of the Pesach [offering]” (Sh’mos 34).

If the Chaggigah of the 14th had these laws in common with the Pesach offering, did it also have the same status regarding Shabbos? Could it be sacrificed on Shabbos, just like the Pesach offering? Tosafos (70a) say clearly that according to Ben Teima, it was brought even on Shabbos.

Now, that’s very nice, but the halacha should presumably follow the opinion of the “anonymous mishnah” rather than the “outside” opinion of Ben Teima. However, there is another anononymous mishnah in Maseches P’sachim (116a) which in fact corroborates the opinion of Ben Teima, stating that “on this night we eat only roasted meat”; according to the author of the previously-cited “stam mishnah”, there would be no requirement to eat the Chaggigah in any specific style. This mishnah, the gemara clearly states (70a), follows the opinion of Ben Teima.

Now, the rule is that whenever we have two anonymous mishnahs within a single tractate, we follow the one which is presented second (Halichos Olam 3:17). And indeed, Tosafos (114b “Sh’nei minei bassar”) write that the halacha follows Ben Teima’s opinion.

The only problem is that, in the very next paragraph, Tosafos write that, at least at first glance, there is no reason to cook two items if Erev Pesach falls on Shabbos, since the Chaggigah of the 14th is not brought on Shabbos!

This clear contradiction is not so difficult to accept once one realizes that the Tosafos published on the final chapter of P’sachim are from a different author than those printed in the rest of the masechta (see E.E. Orbach, Ba’alei Ha-Tosafos, pp. 608-09 (1985 edition)). And yet it does make our search for a halachic authority that holds that the Chaggigah is brought even on Shabbos a bit more difficult. Perhaps the Tosafos on 70a agrees that we follow the latter “anonymous mishnah”; or perhaps they agree with the reasoning of the Rambam (whatever that might have been).

So what’s the bottom line? While Rosh and Me’iri hold that one ought not to set out an egg on Saturday night in commemoration of the Chaggigah, since the Temple might be speedily built and people come to think that the Chaggigah overrides Shabbos, the halacha (see Bach on O.C. 473, cited in Mishna B’rurah) follows the opinion of R’ Peretz, and we do display the egg no matter what, since not having it would indicate that we are usually treating it not merely as a symbol, but rather as actual consecrated food, which is problematic.

And according to our analysis, it is possible, according to one set of Tosafos, that the halacha follows Ben Teima, and that the Chaggigah sacrifice is indeed brought on Shabbos. Thus, in a sense, either way you look at it, it is correct to use the egg.

From The Devil's Dictionary

I is the first letter of the alphabet, the first word of the language, the first thought of the mind, the first object of affection. In grammar it is a pronoun of the first person and singular number. Its plural is said to be We, but how there can be more than one myself is doubtless clearer to the grammarians than it is to the author of this incomparable dictionary. Conception of two myselves is difficult, but fine. The frank yet graceful use of "I" distinguishes a good writer from a bad; the latter carries it with the manner of a thief trying to cloak his loot.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"There's nothing like a bible-thumping moralist to ruin a party."

- RBC

Ephraim Stulberg on Shemini, 5765

In this week’s parasha, we find that one may not teach Torah when drunk (Vayikra 10:10-11). What sorts of things does this injunction include? The gemara (Karaysos 13b) gives a list:

“And to separate between the holy and profane” – these are the arachin valuations
“between impure and pure” – these are laws of ritual impure
“And to teach Israel” – these are halachic decisions [i.e. what is forbidden and what permitted]
“the ‘chuqqim’ ” – these are laws derived from Midrashic Principles
“that God spoke to them” – these are the Laws given to Moshe at Sinai
“in the hands of Moshe” – this is the Talmud

It goes on to say that the verse does not prohibit things that cannot lead to a halachic decision, such as Mishna, since it is not permitted to derive laws directly from a mishna. According to Rabbi Yose son of R’ Yehuda, even Talmud study and teaching is permitted, since one is not allowed to decide halacha based solely on statements in the Talmud. (What these rules mean is not so clear. See the commentaries on Niddah 7b and Bava Basra 130b, where these rules are also applied).

The Sifra has a slightly different explanation of the verse. Instead of including the Talmud in the prohibition, it includes the Written Torah under the phrase “In the hands of Moshe”. And it excludes the Targum, since the Targum isn’t a legitimate source of halachic information.

What does this mean? First of all, how can the Sifra suggest that we are allowed to base halachic rulings solely on the Written Torah? And secondly, how is it that the Targum is any different than the Written Torah that it translates?

Perhaps we can explain things this way. The rule that we don’t issue halachic decisions based solely on Mishna, as Rashi explains in his commentary on Niddah (7b), means that we don’t appeal to the authority of a mishna as being the final word, since it may after all merely be a minority opinion. The style of the mishna is idiosyncratic, as the mishnayos were written not so much as authoritative rulings as personal traditions that each Tanna received from his teachers. One cannot deduce the final word on a halacha from a mishna.

As such, the Mishna does not represent an active agent in the halachic process. The Ammora’im did not issue their interpretations of the mishna based on the content of particular mishnayos; rather, they held certain opinions, which they then sought to impose back onto the often times vague authority of a mishna or baraisa. If the fit was not good enough, of course, the opinion was rejected; but sometimes great lengths were gone to in order to achieve congruence.

The relationship with the Written Torah, it seems to me, is somewhat different. True, just as the rabbis would manipulate mishnayos, they would also manipulate verses, employing various methodologies in order to get at the law (e.g., see Tosafos on Beitzah 6b – I owe this insight to R’ Reuven Margolis’s little volume called “Yesod Ha-mishna Va-arichasah”). But the intent was not really the same. The attempt was always to deduce the true meaning of the Torah’s verses, not to “fit” a particular rabbinic idea into the Torah’s words. It was not enough for the Torah to simply not contradict a rabbinic idea; a real source was sought after. This is the difference between induction and deduction (though I forget now which is which!)

Thus we are prohibited even from LEARNING the Written Torah (or employing the Midrashic Principles, or studying a Halacha Le-Moshe Mi-Sinai) lest we come to derive from them, in our intoxicated state of mind, a new halacha. Such a fear does not exist regarding the Mishna, since the process there is quite the reverse. The Mishna is not a creative source for halacha, and therefore we are not afraid that we might derive new insights from it while under the influence.

It is the same with the Targum. The Targum was not given to Moshe at Sinai, in spite of the popular conception that this is the case (e.g. Rashi on Kiddushin 49a. For an overview, see the article by Re’uven Binyamin Posen in the journal “Sinai”, published by Bar Ilan University). The Targum is a Tannaic work, no less partisan than any other mishna or baraisa, expressing the tradition received by Onkelos from his teachers, R’ Eliezer and R’ Yehoshua (Megilla 3a). As such, it is not an independent source for halacha so much as it is a repository of halachic positions (see, however, Yad Malachi #659). The halachic process thus traces back to the Targum; but it does not flow forward from it. I have tried my best to explain a very difficult Sifra. I realize that what I have said is not halachically true; one is allowed to independently study anything one wishes while drunk (Rambam, Hilchos Bi’as Miqdash, 1:4). It seems likely that the true text of the Sifra is the one found in Karaysos; this is how most commentaries (Ra’avad, G’RA, Malbim) treat it. Neither are the ideas I have expressed regarding the relationship of the halacha to both the Torah and the Mishna entirely convincing to me. As far as the Targum goes, I believe I’m on relatively more solid ground, though even there, it seems there is much room to argue.

From The Devil's Dictionary

Hypocrite, n. One who, professing virtues that he does not respect, secures the advantage of seeming to be what he despises.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Bad guess."

- RBP, re. student's response to question

The Dark Lord's Dictionary Compiled

FYI: I have collected all of my Dark Lord's Dictionary entries into one post, here.

Ephraim Stulberg on Tzav, 5766

Just a brief observation this week: Sacrificial meat which is not consumed within its allotted time is called nosar, “leftovers”. One who allows the meat to get to such a stage has violated a biblical commandment; however, he has the opportunity to remedy the situation by burning the meat (Lev. 7:16-17).

The gemara (P’sahim 3a) tells us that whereas the window in which the peace offering (sh’lamim) may be eaten runs out at the end of the second day from its being offered, the sacrifice’s remainder may not be burnt until the next morning; in fact, under no circumstances may the nosar be burnt during the night.

Why this is so is not readily apparent. Ramban, in his notes on the Torah, makes an analogy between the burning of disqualified sacrificial meats, which are to be disposed of during the day, and the bringing of sacrifices in the first place, which must also be done only in the day. It seems as though the burning of the nosar is not primarily a means of ridding ourselves of it, as is the case with, for instance, hametz. Rather, the burning of nosar is a sort of sacrifice in itself, whose purpose is to atone for our having sinned by not consuming the meat diligently enough.

(On another note, compare the ta'amei ha-miqra of Lev. 7:17 with that of Lev. 19:6 - don't these verses mean different things? Also, see P'sahim 3a - can you explain why the first half of the discussion uses the verse in Ch. 19, while the second uses the verse from Ch. 7. This would make a good d'var torah for anyone who wants to work on it a bit.)

From The Devil's Dictionary

Hospitality, n. The virtue which induces us to feed and lodge certain persons who are not in need of food and lodging.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"What's the dealio?"

- DR

Bad Teams

"If they keep this team together, we could finish 30 out."

- Dave LaPoint

From The Devil's Dictionary

Hippogriff, n. An animal (now extinct) which was half horse and half griffin. The griffin was itself a compound creature, half lion and half eagle. The hippogriff was actually, therefore, only one-quarter eagle, which is two dollars and fifty cents in gold. The study of zoology is full of surprises.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"What, are you going for the 'Tuchis of the Day' award?"

- SG

Update to Sources Indicating Chazal's Scientific Knowledge Was Not Perfect

I have made several additions to this post. The new sources are Niddah 22b, Rabbi Dr. Yehudah (Leo) Levi, and Maharik. In addition, I have added sources or more source information regarding the Rambam, Rabbi David Tzvi Hoffmann, the Chatam Sofer, Rabbi Shlomo Fisher and Rabbi Chaim Malinowitz.

Don't forget to get a haircut before passover

This poor fellow must've forgotten all about it...

From The Devil's Dictionary

Helpmate, n. A wife, or bitter half.

"Now, why is yer wife called a helpmate, Pat?"
Says the priest. "Since the time o' yer wooin'
She's niver assisted in what ye were at -
For it's naught ye are ever doin'."

"That's true of yer Riverence," Patrick replies,
And no sign of contrition evinces;
"But, bedad, it's a fact which the word implies,
For she helps to mate the expinses!"

Marley Wottel.

QUOTI OF THE DAY

"Holy wedlock of marriage!"

- MF the Elder

The Orthodoxy Test #18: Television and Movies

Television and movies are

a) assur and totally worthless
b) not allowed, but not exactly assur
c) ok in small doses but not really kosher
d) ok, but you have to control what you watch
e) perfectly fine
f) Leave this question out of my results

I chose (d). Television and movies are just media, like books, newspapers, magazines and radio. It may be that the television and film industries, relative to other media, produce proportionally more material that one ought to avoid for halachic reasons; one should approach these media with correspondingly greater caution. I don't think, however, that it's necessary or logical to condemn either medium as a whole.

He Who Must Not Be Named on Bereishit

The Talmud and midrash state that the (approximately) 70 rabbis who were forced to translate the Pentateuch into Greek (producing the Septuagint) all (miraculously), independently of each other, altered the verse "Bereishit bara elohim" to read, in their translations, [the Greek equivalent of] "Elohim bara bereishit." This statement is generally understood to mean that the rabbis switched around the words of the verse in their translation, so that one could not erroneously conclude from the verse that some entity named "Bereishit" had created ("bara") "Elohim" (God) - a mistake one could make when reading the words "Bereishit bara elohim" in the verse's original order.

Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of mine at Yeshiva University, was bothered by the following question: ancient Greek was an inflected language (I'm taking his word for that), meaning that the subject and object of a sentence were gramatically identified. I'll explain inflection with an example from English. If I want to express the first person plural as a subject, I say "we", whereas if I want it to be an object, I say "us". This means that English inflects the first person plural to indicate whether it is acting as a subject or as an object. The distinct usages of "I" and "me", "he" and "him", "she" and "her", and "they" and "them" represent similar inflections. These examples notwithstanding, English does not, generally speaking, inflect nouns to indicate their role in a sentence; anglophones identify which words in a sentence play which role based on the sentence's word order. Hence, if I say "The dog bit the cat," you know that the dog did the biting, and the cat was what was bitten - not because of any grammatical modification to the word "dog" or "cat", but because "dog" came before the verb, and "cat" came after. "The cat bit the dog" has an entirely different meaning, while "The dog the cat bit," as a sentence by itself, is ambiguous: who bit whom?

However, when we use inflections, the word order can be changed around without altering the meaning. Thus, "I bit him," "Him I bit," "Him bit I," "Bit I him," etc., all mean the same thing (though some sound awkward). Now, imagine that English inflected all subjects by adding an "o" prefix, and all objects by adding an "i" suffix. Then, "The odog bit the cati" would mean the same thing as "The cati bit the odog," "The cati the odog bit," and "Bit the odog the cati." They would all mean that the dog bit the cat. According to Dr. Bernstein, ancient Greek inflected all subjects and objects, meaning that regardless of word order, the subject in a sentence was always unmistakably the subject, the object clearly the object, etc. If so, Dr. Bernstein asked, what does it mean that the rabbis translated "Bereishit bara elohim" as "Elohim bara bereishit?" In inflected Greek, the word order wouldn't make any difference!

The only answer I can think of is that the Talmud is distinguishing not between word orders but between meanings. In Hebrew, "Bereishit bara elohim" can mean "Bereishit created God," whereas "Elohim bara bereishit" means "God created in the beginning" (or "God created Bereishit"). Perhaps the Talmud is saying that all of the rabbinic translators, via the proper inflections, assigned Genesis 1:1 the meaning "God created in the beginning..." as opposed to "Bereishit created God." The problem with this explanation is, however, obvious: why would any of the rabbis have translated Genesis 1:1 otherwise? Isn't "God created in the beginning..." the interpretation they all actually held to be the correct one? Why is their agreement on this verse's translation noteworthy, and how did they change its meaning?

Again, I have only one suggestion: perhaps the Talmud is saying that in truth, the simple "peshat" of Genesis 1:1 is "Bereishit created God," and that our accepted interpretation of it - "God created in the beginning" - is actually a more awkward way to read the verse; not the "peshat". This seems like an absurd explanation, but I don't know how else to answer the question. Any ideas?